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ABSTRACT 
 
WHY DO PEACE PROCESSES FAIL: THE CASE OF TURKEY 
 
Solak, Hacer 
MA in Political Science and International Relations 
Thesis Advisor: Assist. Prof. Hüseyin Alptekin 
July 2019, 101 Pages 
 
The conflict between Turkey and the Kurdistan Worker’s Party(PKK) has been the 
long-running problem in the Turkish history. Turkey experienced a Resolution Process 
at the end of 2012 in order to end this bloody conflict but it came to the end soon, 
and a new round in the conflict began in 2015. This thesis aims to explain failure of 
the peace process in Turkey with the actor-oriented perspective and discusses how 
spoilers pose threat to peace processes in the case of Turkey. First, I make an analysis 
of Spoiler Theory in the Peace literature by referring the questions that ask what are 
the factors that motivate spoilers to destroy peace? What are the tactics used by 
spoilers to destroy peace processes? Second, I focus on the Turkish case between 
2012 and 2015, with the aim of examining how spoilers play a key role in the collapse 
of peace process in Turkey. I support my arguments with a content analysis of the 
PKK leaders’ discourse used during the peace talks in Turkey.  Finally, I offer 
inferences in terms of if  the concept of spoiler can be applied to the Turkey-PKK case 
in addition to recommendations for peace processes involving spoiler threat.   
 
Key Words: Peace processes, Turkey-PKK conflict, content analysis, resolution 
process 
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ÖZ 
 
WHY DO PEACE PROCESSES FAIL: THE CASE OF TURKEY-PKK CONFLICT 
 
Solak, Hacer 
Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans Programı 
Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Hüseyin Alptekin 
Temmuz 2019, 101 Sayfa 
 
Türkiye ve PKK arasındaki çatışma Türkiye tarihinde uzun bir geçmişe sahiptir. Türkiye 
her ne kadar 2012’nin sonlarında bu kanlı çatışmayı sona erdirmek için bir Çözüm 
Sürecini başlatsa da, süreç başarılı olamamış ve yeni bir çatışma ortamını beraberinde 
getirmiştir. Bu tezde amaçlanan Türkiye’deki barış sürecinin başarısız olmasını aktör 
odaklı bir bakış açısıyla açıklamak ve spoiler(oyun bozucu)denen aktörlerin barış 
süreçlerini nasıl tehdit ettiklerini tartışmaktır. Bu bağlamda ilk olarak, spoiler adı 
verilen aktörler hangi taktikleri kullanarak ve hangi motivasyonlarla barış süreçlerini 
bozarlar gibi sorulardan yola çıkarak Barış Çalışmaları literatüründeki Spoiler Teorisi 
anlatılacaktır. İkinci olarak, 2012 ve 2015 yılları arasında gerçekleşen sürece 
odaklanan bu çalışma, içerik analizi metoduyla yapılan söylem analizlerini kullanarak 
bu aktörler Türkiye’de barış sürecinin sona ermesinde nasıl etkili oldu sorusunu 
cevaplayacaktır.  Son bölümde ise yapılan analiz kapsamındaki çıkarımlar okuyucuyla 
paylaşılacak ve spoiler tehdidiyle karşılaşma olasılığı olan çatışma örnekleri için 
tavsiyeler sunulacaktır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Barış süreçleri, Türkiye-PKK çatışması, içerik analizi, çözüm süreci 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Conflict, integral part of human life, is defined as a divergence of interests among 
separate groups who believe that they can never achieve their goals simultaneously 
(Pruitt and Rubin, 1986). As the world has globalized, conflict has become complex. 
That is why, those who intend to resolve conflict by peaceful means must understand 
the nature of conflict and peace in the contemporary world. Otherwise, it could be 
easy to return to conflict even though peace is achieved between conflicting parties. 
For example, between 1945 and 2009 of the 103 civil wars 59 returned to war (UCDP/ 
PRIO Dataset, 2009). the World Banks’s 2011 World Development Report 2011 says 
resurgence of violent conflicts dominate armed conflict (Westendorf, 2015). In some 
cases, conflicting parties engage in a negotiation process but they fail to sign a peace 
agreement. In other cases, even though a peace agreement is achieved, parties 
cannot successfully implement the agreement because every peace process creates 
actors who intend to disrupt or change the course of the process. (Stedman, 1997).  
 
Based on the question of why peace processes fail through resurgence to violence, 
this thesis argues that spoilers- groups, parties or leaders who use violence and 
stealth methods to destroy peace- are the greatest threat to peace processes 
(Stedman, 1997). I argue that, Turkey1-Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) peace process 
has been destroyed by actors called as spoilers who use violence and stealth methods 
such as persuasion and incitement. At that point, this thesis mainly aims to study how 
spoilers led to the collapse of peace process in Turkey. In Turkish case the leaders of 
the PKK-HDP wing2 appeared as the inside spoiler who participated in negotiations 
and seemed willing to commit to peace deal but led to the last of the process by 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1 By Turkey this thesis adresses the government of the JDP who runned the Resolution Process and 
hold talks with Öcalan. 
2 The PKK is a terrorist organization which has an executive body called KCK and an armed body called 
HPG. By PKK-HDP wing this thesis means the top figures of the PKK and the HDP. By leaders of the PKK 
this thesis means the main figues who have decision making power in the executive and armed body 
of the PKK. 
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cheating. This situation could have been avoided if custodians-independent actors 
who are responsible to keep peace- of the peace process had managed the spoilers. 
The main purpose of this thesis is to explain the impact of spoilers in collapse of peace 
processes in Turkey. How do spoilers destroy peace processes question will be 
answered over the case of Turkey peace process between 2013 and 2015. I will be 
using Spoiler theory to explore turkey-PKK peace talks. For better understanding of 
the case of Turkey, the next section explains the main thresholds in the process.  
 
1.1.Historical Background 
1.1.1. Peace Talks between Turkey and the PKK 
The Kurdish question dates back to the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. In the 
1920s and the 1930s, there were quite number of Kurdish rebellions such as Koçgiri 
(1921), Şeyh Said (1925), Ağrı (1926-1930), Oramar (1930) and Dersim (1937) in 
response to efforts for creating Turkish nation state (Yanmış&Hanili, 2016). Until the 
emergence of the PKK as a military organization, the state adopted the policy of 
assimilation and repression (Yeğen, 2015). The governments came to power after the 
foundation of Turkish nation state, ignored presence of Kurdish identity and did not 
give them their political and civil rights. Furthermore, Turkey saw Kurds in Syria and 
Iraq as a potential threat to territorial integrity of himself. That is why Turkish state 
adopted a policy to keep Kurds in the border countries under control (Yeğen, 2015). 
These policies of assimilation, repression and containment have an influence on 
attitudes of Kurds towards Turkish state. Individuals may identify themselves with 
ethnicity or nation (Sambanis&Shayo, 2017). The identity that they choose affect 
their support on resistance. State policies contributed Kurds to identify themselves 
with their ethnic group and made them more salient as an ethnic group.  Hence, they 
responded state policies by supporting the PKK founded in 1978. Since 1984, the PKK 
warred openly against the state. In response, the state treated the Kurdish question 
as a security issue (Ensaroğlu, 2013). The PKK appeared a s a terrorist organization 
which launched armed assaults, kidnappings, bomb attacksi and sabotages etc. the 
conflict between Turkey and the PKK intensified especially in the 1990s. Still, there 
were peace initiatives in Turkish politics. the first initiatives for peace came during 
the President Turgut Özal era in 1991 (ibid). The PKK announced a ceasefire in 1993. 
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However, after Özal dead the PKK cancelled the ceasefire and killed soldiers in Bingöl 
(ibid). In the era of Necmettin Erbakan, who was the Prime Minister of Turkey from 
1996 to 1997, Erbakan and Refah Party generated an inclusive language in politics in 
a way to emphasize call politicians to discuss the Kurdish issue and bring peace to 
Turkey (Youtube, “Kürt Meselesi ve Çözümü”, 2013). In the era of the JDP, the 2000s 
saw new attempts for peace especially following negotiations for EU membership. 
There were so many implementations relevant to Kurdish issue such as removal of 
state of emergency, lifting the ban on Kurdish language etc. Turkey was entering into 
new process where state was conducting secret negotiations with Öcalan in Oslo. 
However, this process called Oslo Process including direct talks with Öcalan also failed 
and Turkey saw the most violent conflict between 2009 and 2011 according to the 
report of International Crisis Group.3 
 
Turkey experienced the most comprehensive resolution process (2013-2015) after 
the Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that talks were going on between Turkish 
Intelligence Agency (MIT) and Abdullah Öcalan on 28 December 2012 (Yeğen, 2015). 
Following Erdoğan’s announcement of the resolution process, conciliatory discourse 
formerly contributed to rise of hope and trust for peace. Öcalan sent a letter to be 
read during Nevruz (a day of celebration for Kurds and Turks) in both Turkish and 
Kurdish that called the PKK to withdraw from Turkey’s territories. In response, the 
PKK announced that it would withdraw from Turkey to Northern Iraq. Government 
officials and Öcalan agreed on three stages for peace: a ceasefire and the withdrawal 
of the PKK from Turkey, democratization, and disarmament and demobilization (ibid). 
While political meetings held by the elites on one side, on the other, a wise man 
committee was established in order to give voice to the public. The wise man 
committee included intellectuals, academicians, journalists, artists and authors. They 
took responsibility for preparing the public for the process and they went to hear 
what members of the public thought about the peace process. Members of the wise 
men committee were classified according to seven regions in Turkey. They were 
assigned to conduct field research. The results of the survey demonstrated that there 
                                                                                                                                                                            
3 Turkey and the PKK: Saving the Peace Process. Crisis Group Europe Report 
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was support from all parts of Turkey as to the solution process (T24, 2013). During 
this time, the government adopted “the Law to End Terror and Strengthen Social 
Integration”, this law gave bureaucrats and government officials authority to decide 
what needed to be done to end terrorism. According to Deputy Prime Minister Beşir 
Atalay, this law showed that the government was committed to continuing the peace 
process (Daily sabah, 2014). 
 
1.1.2. The Collapse of the Peace Process 
The second half of 2013 and 2014 were problematic one in terms of the course of the 
peace process. The peaceful atmosphere began to heat up and harsh rhetoric 
returned. Kobani issue was one of the main cases that change the course of the 
process because the PKK and Kurdish politicians used Kobane attacks to provoke local 
people. Kobane was a battleground between YPG and ISIS. In the end of September 
battle in the border of Turkey intensified. In October, ISIS began to take some districts 
in Kobane (BBC, 2015).  
 
“Should this massacre attempt succeed (in Kobane), it will both bring an end to the 
ongoing process of resolution and lay the foundations for a new coup that will last 
long” Öcalan said (Rudaw, 2014). 
 
People’s Democratic Party (HDP) also threatened Turkey by stating if Kobane fall, the 
peace process would come to an end. In October 2014, 50 people died and many 
injured in ISIS-Kobane protests after Demirtaş called for protests (Hürriyet, 2014). 
This crisis started when HDP officials called the masses out on to the streets in order 
to protest the ongoing events in Syria and Kobane. After it became certain that 
Kobane was about to be captured by ISIS people took to the streets. As a result of 
these protests, In October 20, Turkey allowed Peshmerga to cross Syria from Turkey 
(the Guardian, 2014). This might have been a new hope for the peace process. 
However, on October 25, the PKK attacked the Yüksekova district in Hakkari and killed 
three soldiers (Hürriyet Daily News, 2014).  
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The process came to an end with the Suruç attack took place in Suruc, a province of 
Sanlıurfa and 33 people who sought help to the people of Kobane were killed. (BBC 
News, 2015). Soon after, the PKK killed two police officers by saying murder of polices 
officers was in revenge. They were executed while sleeping in their beds. (Al Jazeera, 
2015). Although ISIS claimed responsibility for the Suruç attack, Kurdish people and 
PKK leaders accused Turkey because they thought that the state supported ISIS. 
Following this events, military operations against PKK militants on the border of 
Turkey had already been launched on July 25 2015 (The New York Times, 2015). 
Furthermore, on July 28 2015, Erdoğan formally declared the end of the peace 
process by saying “It is not possible to continue peace with those who threaten our 
national unity and brotherhood” (the Guardian, 2015). As a response to Yüksekdağ’s 
speech stating “we lean on the YPJ, the YPG and the PYD” Erdoğan announced the 
decision to lift immunities of HDP deputies (Hürriyet Daily News, 2015). Erdoğan said 
that he would fight against terrorism to the end. In July 2015, “Trench Operations” 
began in the southern provinces of Turkey including Sur, Cizre, and Nusaybin. These 
operations was for destructing trenches of PKK militants in cities. As a response to 
the PKK’s proclaimations of democratic autonomy in some Kurdish towns by digging 
trenches, building barricades, establishing its own courts and collecting taxes, the 
government conducted trench operations in Sur, Cizre, and Nusaybin against 
insurgents. Prime Minister Davutoğlu announced that Turkey had begun air 
operations aginst the PKK and its offshoot organizations in order to rebuild public 
order in southern Turkey.  
 
1.2. Statement of the Problem 
As seen in the previous section, the resolution process in Turkey was initiated by 
leaders who changed the state perception of Kurds for the first time in Turkish 
political history. Yet, it could not go further because the PKK kept violating the 
ceasefire by using force and non-violent means. This thesis aims to show how the 
PKK’s spoiling activities deteriorated the Turkish peace process by taking the PKK’s 
motivations to do so into consideration. I will mainly focus on the dates between 
2012, when the PKK announced a ceasefire and a dialogue process began in public 
and 2015, when PKK resumed attacks against the state. The Turkey-PKK peace 
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process which took place between the end of 2012 and 2015 appears to be a failed 
peace story. What causes such failures, especially when cases where the 
governments and rebel groups agree that the peace is benefit of all, what happened 
and they resumed conflict. Why are peace processes broken in ethnic conflicts? Why 
does conflict escalate after conflicting parties sit down together at the negotiating 
table? What are the driving forces behind the failure of peace accords? These are the 
guiding questions that push me to explain the demise of the peace processes in 
Turkey. In this thesis, I will address why and how peace process failed in Turkey with 
reference to Spoiler Theory.  
 
In the case of Turkey, the jailed leader of the PKK Öcalan, and state officials conducted 
a negotiation. Although they agreed on the withdrawal of the PKK militants, KCK and 
extremist leaders in the PKK insisted on demands such as establishment of 
democratic autonomy in southeastern Turkey. Even though politicians softened 
discourse concerning demands for regional autonomy in their speeches, they 
attempted to set up self-governance during the process in the environment where 
the Syrian civil war encouraged them to sustain war (ibid). KCK leaders and HDP 
politicians did not leave persuasive rhetoric that would accelerated reconciliation 
between Kurdish and Turkish people. In the absence of any coercive mechanisms 
managed by third parties they used terrorism to destabilize the peace process. For 
this reason, this thesis assumes that Spoiler Theory can be applied to the Turkish case.  
 
Peace process literature offers convincing explanations including economic, social, 
psychological factors that affect peace talks and patterns that destroy peace 
processes. While all conflicts produce different dynamics, some are common in the 
sense that they can be spoiled by incentive or outside actors who are motivated by 
indigenous and exogenous factors such as rise in capabilities and opportunities to the 
group. This thesis argues that the actor-based explanation is applicable to explain 
why peace processes collapse. Best institutional peace-making methods can are likely 
to fail if actors change its perception of peace when they consider returning war is in 
their interest (Stedman, 1997).  In that case, Spoiler Theory seem applicable in this 
thesis since it develops a terminology which is based on role of actors themselves in 
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the course of peace processes. However, since it mainly focuses on the role of third 
parties, it is not capable of addressing motivations, goals and tactics used by spoilers 
in an attempt to stall peace processes. Thus, the Turkey-PKK case also allows me to 
provide comprehensive perspective in explaining how spoilers become the greatest 
threat to successful progression of peace processes.  
 
1.3.Significance of the Study 
This study provides a better understanding of how the transition period from conflict 
to peace may face obstacles. It shows the nature of the peace process in its political 
context. It serves the literature by looking at how important changes in the demands 
or expectations of one of the parties may suddenly alter the course of the process. 
They do not have fixed demands or behaviors. They can change their perceptions of 
peace when they think peace is not to their interests. When this way of thinking 
happen it is not possible to sustain peace atmosphere even though conflicting parties 
reach a peace agreement. It also allows one to observe the main motivations of the 
groups involved in the peace process. By doing so, it demonstrates the importance of 
the surrounding environment in conflict resolution.  
 
This thesis also contributes to Spoiler Theory. Stedman promotes three reasons 
behind actors’ turning to spoilers. First one is fear of loosing the feeling of security. 
Parties to peace deal might consider a peace agreement as a threat to their presence 
(Stedman, 1997; Walter&Snyder, 1999). Second, parties may have a greedy 
perception towards peace process since they want to have a stronger position to get 
what they want. Third, parties, total spoilers, who are prone to change their 
perception of peace are motivated by desire to gain more under the circumstances 
of war rather than as in peace (Stedman, 1997).  This thesis offers a broader 
explanation through making a contextual analysis in order to examine motivations of 
spoilers. The peace process in Turkey, which came to end in 2015, is one of the less-
studied cases since it has just occurred. Through this case study, I test whether Spoiler 
Theory is able to explain the failure of peace processes. This study also refines the 
theory since it focuses on a process in which negotiations ended following intense 
attacks by the PKK. By taking into account the reasons for a  failure in sustaining peace 
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in a country that has to deal with regional instability, it also provides lessons for 
future peace initiatives in such regions. 
 
1.4. Research Questions 
This thesis starts from the basic assumption that spoiling activities of those who want 
to disrupt peace accords are the main determinant of the success or failure of peace 
processes (Newman and Richmond, 2006). While in the post-Cold War era there has 
been a rise in optimism about establishing durable peace in conflict regions, almost 
half of the peace processes in the period have ended in a return to violence (ibid). 
Turkey’s unfortunate experience is just one of them. This study is motivated by the 
question of ‘why the peace process failed in Turkey?’ Government officials and 
leaders of the PKK agreed peaceful solutions to the root causes of ethnic conflict in 
Turkey. Öcalan announced that fight with the state was over and PKK announced a 
ceasefire afterwards (Yeğen, 2015). The agreement between the parties included a 
ceasefire and the withdrawal of the PKK as well as democratisation, and disarmament 
and normalization (ibid). However, the PKK stopped its withdrawal suddenly in May 
2013 (ibid). This was followed by further steps from government to protect the 
process by legalizing the process throguh enacted laws to contact leaders from the 
PKK (ibid). Still, the process was being spoiled by the PKK through violent attacks and 
persuasion of Kurdish people that harmed the resolution process. All these 
developments which I also personally observed pushed me to focus on individual 
threats to peace. Thus, I put my research question as follows: How do spoilers play a 
key role in the collapse of peace process in Turkey? In order to develop a deeper 
understanding of the impact of spoilers on peace processes, this thesis aims to 
answer the following questions: What are the factors that motivate spoilers to 
destroy peace? How can the concept of spoiler can be applied to the Turkey-PKK 
case? What are the tactics used by spoilers to destroy peace processes?  
 
1.5. Research Design 
A peace process is more than an absence of violence. It requires establishing, 
implementing and maintaining peace through political, physical, economic and 
psychological measures (ibid). It is based on a cost and benefit analysis so, it is wrong 
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to reduce peace process into numerical statistics only. This thesis uses process-
tracing method in order to explain the causal relationship between independent 
variable absence/presence of spoilers and the dependent variable failure/success of 
peace processes. An intervening variable describing success of spoilers is presence of 
opportunity-effective spoiler management- and capabilities- resources to continue 
conflict- (Stedman, 1997, Darby&Mac Ginty, 2008).  The purpose of this study is to 
make clear how A-spoiler actors- leads to B, failure in peace process. By looking at 
the events and sequence in the Turkey-PKK peace process case, my thesis also 
measures relevance of Spoiler Theory. The process tracing method is based on causal 
process observations (Bennet and Checkel, 2010). For each step explaining the 
connection between A-spoiler actors- and B-failure in peace process- must be 
described and tested (ibid). Within this framework, this thesis follows the steps laid 
out below: 
 
First, I provide a theoretical framework by using an existing theory in peace studies. 
This step contains refined understanding of spoiler impact on peace processes. I 
provide entities and acts regarding each stage which creates a theoretical causal 
mechanism in theory. (Beach and Pedersan, 2013).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
In the case of Turkey, the leaders of the PKK-HDP wing can be considered as the 
spoilers of Turkey’s peace process since it acted in a way to terminate the ceasefire 
especially after its affiliate group PYD/YPG gained an upper hand in Syria. The PKK 
backed by those groups reevaluated the costs and benefits of peace and returned to 
war. It gave up pulling militants to Syria and Iraq. Furthermore, it gave birth to groups 
who committed street violence. The absence of an effective spoiler management 
mechanism made the PKK successful to improve its spoiling acts by using violence 
and other tactics. Furthermore, it mobilized Kurdish people in a way that ended the 
resolution process. In response, the government launched military operations in 
order to guarantee state security. Finally, the negotiation process came to halt.  
 
Step two includes evidence to support the causal mechanism I mentioned before. For 
example, in order to demonstrate the rise in violent attacks by the PKK during the 
peace process I use to PKK attacks data in Global Terrorism Database. This part also 
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disproves alternative hypothesized mechanisms by providing chronologic events and 
discourse as evidence. I use both account evidence (observational evidence) and 
pattern evidence (statistics) (CDI Practice Paper Annex). In the next step, I collect 
evidence regarding Turkey-PKK case through archive research and newspapers, by 
looking at reports of politicians who involved in peace process. In defining how and 
why spoilers destroy peace process in discourse in Turkey-PKK peace process, I carry 
out a content analysis of the statements of important figures in KCK including Cemil 
Bayık, Duran Kalkan (Selahattin Erdem), Hülya Oran (Bese Hozat) and the head of HDP 
Selahattin Demirtaş4 because they are the top figures who have an influence on 
Kurdish minority.5 In addition, they are the decision makers as representatives of the 
parties involved in peace process in Turkey. In order to show how and why these 
names made a choice to spoil peace, I do frequent analysis on the basis of word 
frequency. I use both manifest analysis by focusing on the word frequency and latent 
analysis in order to reach a reliable data in explaining in what sense these words were 
stated. I focus on Özgür Gündem and Yeni Özgür Politika newspapers from Turkey. I 
looked at these newspapers, because, they are read by Kurdish people mostly. Thus, 
the names I mentioned above share their ideas and decisions via these newspapers 
mainly. I use spoiling code if statements of KCK6 and HDP leaders cause escalation of 
conflict by using the words below:  
 
Spoiling 
 Resistance (Direniş) 
 Serhildan7 
 People’s Revolutionary war (Halk Savaşı) 
 Kobane Resistance (Kobane Direnişi) 
 Rojava Revolution (Rojava Devrimi) 
                                                                                                                                                                            
4 Selahattin Demirtaş is not a member of the PKK but I include him in the list of spoilers be because he 
had significant influence over the course of the resolution process and at times used this influence to 
spoil the process. cause he has acted as a spoiler especially in the Kobane events which was one of 
spoiling activities during the peace process. 
5 I did not include Murat Karayılan because I included Hülya Oran who wre the co-leaders of the 
PKK/KCK. 
6 Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) is the top of the PKK’s executive structure including legislative, 
assembly, regional-urban assemblies; executive and judiciary bodies.  
7 This World is used to describe all of the Kurdish insurrections in Turkey since the 1990s.  
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 Demobilization (Tasfiye) 
 Assimilation8 (Asimilasyon) 
 Genocide (Katliam/Soykırım) 
 Fascist mentality (Faşist zihniyet) 
 ISIS alliance (IŞİD müttefiki) 
 
I take these words as signals of spoiling behavior since when the leaders intend to 
give inciting messages to masses they mainly refer to significant issues such as 
“Kobane” or “Rojava” as well as massacres in the past. Naturally, the mass protests 
come right after use of these provocative words. To sum up, these symbolic words or 
phrases have an influence on Kurdish minority in a way to remind them the human 
rights violations and massacres in the past. On the other hand, I use the code of pro-
resolution process if leaders contribute to resolution process by using words as 
follows: 
 
Pro-resolution 
 Negotiation (Müzakere) 
 Peace (Barış) 
 Withdrawal (Çekilme) 
 Solution (Çözüm) 
 Optimism (İyimserlik) 
 Democratization (Demokratikleşme) 
 New beginning (Yeni Başlangıç) 
 Newroz (Nevruz) 
 Political struggle (Siyasi Mücadele) 
 
These words and phrases chosen because these are the most repeated ones during 
the positive atmosphere of the peace. For example, especially “Newroz” and “new 
beginning” have become symbols of parties’ intention to the resolution in Turkey.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
8 The concept of assimilation does not spoil detachedly, but because the HDP and the PKK have used 
this concept to spoil, I include this concept in the list.  
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1.6. Theoretical Framework 
Since peace process is defined as the management of conflict in an attempt to end 
violence it has a multidimensional characteristic containing ceasefire between 
combatants, construction of political institutions, and prevention of further conflict 
(Tonge, 2014:7). There are several stages that must be completed by the parties 
involved in a peace process. A dialogue process that is generally initiated by moderate 
leaders secretly or publicly is followed by a ceasefire so that conflicting parties can 
agree to a mutual recognition of aims (ibid). Afterwards, parties come together to 
discuss peace agreement. Political negotiations are followed by demobilization, 
disarmament and reintegration (DDR). In order to transform peace processes into 
permanent peace the final step must be psychological reconciliation (ibid). However, 
in most cases peace processes face serious obstacles when actors involved in peace 
deals ignore the process and continue violence. Reevaluated costs and benefits of 
peace or policy priorities may lead them to stall the peace process (Tonge: 20). 
Stedman calls these actors “spoilers” and they can be inside an outside actors in 
Stedman’s terminology (1997). Actors who are oppose to a peace agreement 
inevitably emerge. Inside spoilers are those who become a party to peace but do not 
commit the requirements of the peace deal. Outside spoilers are those who remain 
in out of the peace process thus, take violent actions in order to harm the process 
(Stedman, 1997). If there is no effective spoiler management by custodians and if 
would-be spoilers have capabilities and opportunities, the cost of a return to violence 
declines and they become likely to succeed in stopping peace-building efforts (Darby 
and Mac Ginty, 2008: 166).  Spoilers may do this in two ways: by entering the 
negotiation process but not fulfilling their obligations and by using violent or stealth 
methods to break peace (ibid). One must understand the goals of spoilers so that 
responsive mechanisms to prevent them can be developed. According to Stedman 
there are three types of spoilers that differ in their goals: 
 
Limited Spoiler 
Limited spoilers are those who are willing to negotiate with their limited demands 
such as recognition, security and power sharing (1997:7). If their demands are met, 
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they do not pose any threats to the peace process. They are the least dangerous ones 
in terms of the commitment to the peace deal. 
 
Total Spoiler 
This type of spoiler has a certain goal and insists achieving that goal. They come to 
the table only to spoil it later. They can use force to pursue their own goals. 
 
Greedy Spoiler 
Greedy Spoilers’ goals change depending on the situation. They can expand targets 
in accordance with their cost-benefit calculations. Still, they are willing to 
compromise. Even though they want peace like limited spoilers, they can turn into a 
total spoiler.  
 
Based on the different types of spoilers, the thing is to show how and the conditions 
under which they spoil peace. These actors may return to war for a variety reasons. 
However, as long as the conflict environment is not favorable, they cannot go further. 
On this point, the environmental conditions in peace talks are the main determinant 
of spoiler behaviour. If they have the capacity and to achieve more by fighting then 
they become more likely to resort to war. Spoilers must also have the capability to 
do so, namely the resources and opportunity to return to violence. This capability is 
provided by two sources: foreign aid and regional linkages (2008:167). As these 
resources are available to spoiler groups, they refuse to commit to demobilization 
and disarmament. Actors consider whether or not they have capacity to fight. If 
spoilers have access to arms and other support from external actors, they are difficult 
to quash. For example, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia was eliminated by ending their 
international sponsorship which lost them the military capacity to sustain fighting 
(Tonge, 2014: 60). Similarly, one reason for the success of the peace process in 
Mozambique was that the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) did not have 
access to resources (ibid). Beyond capability, what matters also is an independent 
actor who is able to manage spoilers. From this point of view, the presence of third 
parties with effective spoiler management strategies is critical to prevent spoilers. 
Although such third parties can affect the behavior of spoilers, their mere presence 
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is not enough to ensure a peace settlement. In Stedman’s terminology, they have to 
follow three methods. Spoilers who cheat peace deals succeed if there is no 
mechanism such as inducement, socialization or coercion.  
 
Inducement 
Inducement strategy requires addressing the grievances that cause a conflict. A group 
may demand recognition, protection, and justice. When these demands are met, it 
might be convinced to fulfill its commitments to a peace deal. This method may be 
enough for a limited spoiler. 
 
Socialization 
This strategy is more about establishing system of norms including human rights, 
good governance, and accountability during the peace process so that groups who 
spoil peace cannot legitimize their acts. This requires judging whether a demand is 
legitimate or not.  
 
Coercion 
Coercion refers to deterring by threat of use of violence. There are two versions of a 
coercion strategy: departing terrain and withdrawal. Departing terrain basically 
means that the peace train will continue on in any case even if some actors are left 
behind. In a withdrawal strategy, third parties who are responsible for managing the 
peace process can threaten to withdraw their support from combatants. This method 
seems more applicable to total spoilers. They cannot be convinced by inducement or 
socialization methods since they consider the situation all-or-nothing (Stedman, 
1997: 12). Custodians may bring them to the table by using force directly or 
threatening them by use of force.  
 
1.7. Outline of the Thesis 
Chapter two explains the theoretical framework of the study. It answers the question 
of how spoilers break peace processes. In so doing, it explains the contextual 
motivations involved when parties who agree to a peace deal engage in spoiling acts. 
This chapter also emphasizes how spoilers are encouraged unless third parties 
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effectively manage spoiling. Chapter three analyzes the correlation between 
variables mentioned in the theory chapter. It does so by taking the Turkish case into 
account explaining the Turkey-PKK peace process between 2012 and 2015. Who were 
the spoilers in Turkish case? What motivated them? How did they spoil peace? What 
were the main issues that could be seen as signs of spoiling? With these questions, 
this chapter offers evidence in support of the theoretical framework. The conclusion 
part includes outcomes in accordance with evidences gathered by the content 
analysis method. I evaluate whether or not spoiler theory can explain Turkey’s failure 
in promoting a durable peace.  
 
1.8. Literature Review 
A peace process involves the “cessation of conflict through ceasefire”, 
“implementation of political arrangements”, and “prevention of recurrence of 
conflict” (Tonge, 2014). Nicole Ball divides peace processes into two stages: cessation 
of conflict and peacebuilding. For the cessation of conflict, negotiation is crucial to 
reaching a peace agreement. This stage is followed by the consolidation of peace by 
implementing the provisions of peace agreement and promoting social reconciliation 
(Ball, 2001). A successful peace process requires maintaining the ceasefire and 
implementating peace deals (Flowers, 2010). After a dialogue process among parties 
to remove their mutual distrust and stereotypes the parties establish a ceasefire 
(Crocker, Hampson and Aal, 2001). In general, the negotiation stage starts when 
parties come to the point of “mutually hurting stalemate” which means that parties 
realize they cannot attain their goals militarily (Zartman, 2005). This situation, called 
a “ripe moment”, pushes them to negotiate an agreement that meets the basic needs 
of both sides. The implementation stage begins when parties sign a peace accord 
(Flowers, 2010). Peace implementation is carrying out goals the parties agreed to in 
the accord. In this stage, parties agree to implement measures such as demobilization 
and disarmament that are required for a conflict resolution which includes a long 
process that aims to underline root causes of conflict (Burton, 1990). Implementation 
stage of a peace process is fragile because right after parties agree on the basic issues, 
they may not comply with their responsibilities regarding the agreement. For those 
who studied civil war in the 1980s, signing of a peace agreement was the main 
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objective for conflict resolution. However, end of the 1990s and the 2000s showed 
that the period right after peace agreement is critical because parties can easily 
return to violence (Flowers, 2010).  
 
The success of a peace process lies in ending violence and confrontation as well as in 
establishing institutions to sustain the end of violence (Hampson, 1997). A peace 
process does not succeed when conflicting parties sign a peace agreement. There are 
several agreements to end conflict but not all have been implemented successfully 
(Ibid). Thus, there is no guarantee that a peace agreement will bring about a 
sustainable peace. In case peace implementation cannot be completed succesfully, 
peace processess fail.  In order to explain why peace processes fail some studies 
address the social and psychological dimensions of peace, others focus on how 
material parameters can complement peace. I will discuss each in turn.  
 
1.8.1. Socio-Psychological Explanations 
There are three reasons why peace processes are broken even though a peace 
agreement is signed (Brewer, 2013). One of them is lack of involvement from civil 
society. It is essential to include civil society institutions, organizations and groups in 
a peace process. Civil society functions as a platform in which victims are given voice. 
Furthermore, it helps local people and groups to engage in the peace process. Civil 
society helps articulate the basic needs that must be met to resolve conflict. For 
example, Brewer claims that after a catastrophic civil war Rwanda saw a successful 
reconciliation process. This is mostly because civil society was always involved in the 
peace process. A second reason why peace processes fail is that they can force people 
to change familiar views, ideas, routines and behaviours. This “ontological 
insecurity”, fear of losing identity in other words, can push parties to violence. Finally, 
certain kind of emotions like hatred and revenge are obstacles to success of peace 
processes; collective memories of things like past killings or genocides, may provoke 
these emotions, and peace is challenged by those who keep these emotions alive 
(Bar-Tal&Halperin, 2013). In all three cases, psychological barriers threaten both the 
conclusion of peace agreement and the subsequent reconciliation process (Ibid). The 
author proposes several strategies to overcome these barriers, including conferences 
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for healing divisions among people, truth commissions and shame apologies which 
means statement of shame for past mistakes to deescalate conflict (Brewer 2013).  
 
Fear is a direct obstacle to peace processes because it pushes parties to violence. 
According to Walter and Snyder (1994), there are certain types of situations that 
produce fear: the collapse of government, the isolation of minority group backing 
armed terrorist groups, change in economic resources and so on (Schulz, 2004).  
These situations encourage violence. For example, Israeli-Palestinian peace process 
was corrupted simply because the Oslo process (1993) could not address fears and 
uncertainty among conflicting parties towards each other (Schulz, 2004). Parties who 
were involved in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process failed to deal with stereotypes 
and hostile images. Then, following the visit of Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount in 
2000, the conflict re-escalated. In terms of fear, there is another study which is worth 
of mentioning. Joy Rothman in his book Resolving Identity-Based Conflict: In Nations, 
Organizations, and Communities, asserts that a negotiation process must address 
issues such as fear of survival and recognition of identity (Rothman, 1997).  That is 
why a dialogue process must include new version of history, relationships and 
images, as well as apologies on both sides so that they can concentrate on peace 
(Ibid). To this end, parties must attempt to reconcile stage if they do not wish to 
return to conflict. 
 
Scholars who pay attention to the importance of institutional settlement argue that 
a reform process must accompany the reconciliation process for durable peace. John 
Brewer argues that achieving stability in peace depends on parallel institutional 
reforms. Power sharing, rule of law, and good governance are essential parameters 
for creating peace in societies that experience ethnically motivated conflict (Brewer, 
2010). Similarly, Jasmine- Kim Westendorf, in her book Why Peace Processes Fail, 
argues that there is a tendency towards technocratic peace processes and that peace 
processes fail because the connection between society and state has disappeared. 
She argues that negotiators’ technocratic approach to peace leaves little room for 
local perspectives. From this point of view, she stresses the importance of post-
conflict peace settlement that focuses on formation of peace by listening local 
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perspectives. Furthermore, she puts emphasis on grievances, unequal distribution of 
resources, failed DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) the absence 
of power-sharing and finally the absence of foreign intervention. Unless these are 
addressed by those who manage a peace process, violence will continue. She 
analyses cases of Cambodia (1991), Mozambique (1992), Liberia (2003) and North 
and South Sudan (2005). Following her case studies, she concludes that security 
building, governance building and transnational justice have a positive impact on the 
durability of peace process (Westendorf, 2015). 
 
William Zartman is an important figure who contributed to negotiation process 
approach to peace literature. He introduced the term deadlock terminology to the 
analysis of negotiations and de-escalation processes. It refers to a position in which 
no further steps can be taken to construct peace. He gives ceasefires that cannot be 
turned into a peace agreement as an example of deadlock. A deadlock can stall 
negotiations and ends hope of restarting a peace process. He describes several 
categories of causes of deadlocks in peace processes (Zartman and Faure 2005). The 
first is cognitive causes that result from different interpretations of conflict and 
peace. One party can perceive peace process as destructive whereas one can see it 
as integrative. Personal causes are related to negative attitudes and distrust between 
conflicting parties. Contextual causes emerge from the pressure of peer groups and 
organizations. Structural causes can be explained by the absence of sufficient 
resources to solve conflict. Finally, behavioral causes arise when one side does not 
keep a promise. Additionally, he mentions strategies to overcome these deadlocks as 
follows: 
 
- Replacing a negotiator who fails to conduct the process effectively 
- Transforming parties’ priorities and emphasizing common interests and 
values 
- Leaving a room to allow a third party to intervene (Zartman, 2005). 
 
Similarly, Licklider brings the question of why do negotiated settlements often not 
work to the literature. A negotiated settlement is a peace process in which both sides 
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set aside their separate goals in order to reach peace agreement (Crocker, Hampson 
and Aall, 2001). Licklider draws attention to inclusiveness in peace processes in his 
article Obstacles to Peace Settlements. He argues that, for a peace process to be 
durable, negotiators must address the root causes of conflicts and deal with security 
dilemmas (Ibid). 
 
As seen above, there are social, cultural and psychological barriers to peace. All the 
theories that I have mentioned here proposes significant dimensions in a peace 
process. However, the fragility of peace processes is also connected to the material 
environment. The following section explains theories addressing materialist 
approaches on peace processes. 
 
1.8.2. Materialist Explanations 
Materially oriented explanations of peace processes tend to focus on the role of 
economics, third parties and conflict environment in how different perceive peace 
and tend to so on the basis of cost-benefit analyses. While some view them as 
complementing approaches that emphasize the psychological dimensions of peace 
and conflict, others find them completely incompatible with a psychological 
approach.  
 
For some scholars, poor economic progress in a post-conflict era is a factor that 
reduces the chance of peace (Fearon&Laitin 2003, Collier&Hoeffler 2004, Walter 
2004). Walter argues that a low level of economic development contributes to 
recurrence of war because it facilitates recruitment to armed groups (Walter, 2004). 
She gives the example of Indonesia. When Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increase 
between 1976 and 1989 people were no longer volunteering to join the group the 
Gerekan Aceh Merdeka/Free Aceh Movement (GAM) (Ibid). However, low economic 
growth and armed group recruitment is only one aspect of war recurrence and only 
explains the individual motivations of people joining armed groups. It does not 
address the social and material causes of the failure of whole peace processes. 
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Many studies in peace research use a rational choice approach to investigate how 
material factors influence actors’ decisions to continue war or to make peace. 
According to rational choice theory actors do not act against their own interests 
(Stedman, 2002). For example, Stedman’s “spoiler violence” theory claims that peace 
processes are undermined by spoilers whose positions, acts and decisions influence 
the course of a peace process (Stedman 1997). The assumption is that, onset or 
recurrence of civil war is caused by material motivations such as expected economic 
and political gains. Actors make decisions to continue war or not, on the basis of these 
expected economic or political gains. For example, available conditions for conflict 
influences conflicting parties’ decision to continue fighting rather than moral 
motivations (Collier and Hoeffler, 2008). Access to resources and shelter, are the 
most important factors that encourage armed groups to fight (Ibid). So long as these 
resources exist conflict will be seen as more profitable than peace. This situation 
brings about withdrawal from peace talks. For example, the failed peace in Sierra 
Leone cannot be understood without taking diamond economy into account. 
Warlords have destructive effects on peace because they want the continuance of 
war to keep themselves in power (Brewer, 2010). Sri Lanka is another case in point. 
In the Sri Lankan conflict between 1983 and 2009, the war economy benefitted both 
the Tamil warlords and the Sri Lankan military. As consequence, Sri Lanka 
experienced a failed peace process in the 1990s and 2000s as well. Many peace 
agreements could not be implemented in Liberia in the 1990s because of the 
warlords there who benefited from the natural resources trade (Flowers, 1997).  
 
For some, third party mediation and monitoring is necessary for peace to be 
implemented. Hampson in Nurturing Peace, strongly emphasizes that role of regional 
powers as third parties is so important (Hampson, 1996). Third party intervention is 
crucial not only in the negotiation process but also in the implementation of peace 
accords (Ibid). They promote commitment to a peace agreement by deterring party 
who intend to stall the peace process. In addition, they help build relationship 
between adversaries and affect their perceptions towards peace (Ibid). When 
external actors take the lead in mediation and the post-settlement process, peace 
agreements tend to hold (Ibid).  Like Hampson, Barbara Walter also emphasizes 
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significance of third parties, significantly in terms of third party pressure on locals to 
commit to disarmament (Walter, 1997). She believes that as long as a strong 
guarantee is available, actors will be deterred from rearming. A strong guarantee 
means the presence of at least ten thousand soldiers (Ibid). In her words: “Only when 
an outside enforcer steps in no guarantee the terms do commitments to disarm and 
share political power become believable. Only then does cooperation become 
possible” (Walter, International Organization: 336).  
 
However, this approach supporting the idea that third party assistance guarantees 
durable peace is challenged by Stedman. He argues that the Rwanda massacre in 
1994 and the recurrence of civil war in Angola in 1992 show that the presence of a 
third party is not the sufficient condition for peace (Stedman, 1997). In the case of 
Rwanda the United Nations failed to deal with spoiler issue in Rwanda because the 
UN focused on Hobyarimana which Stedman defines as only a limited spoiler. 
According to him, total spoiler was Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (CDR) 
which did not fulfil its obligations, promoted ethnic hatred, and committed political 
violence. By not taking the threat posed by the CDR into account, United Nations 
Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) failed (Stedman, 1997). Thus, presence of 
international actors is not enough, rather, the effectiveness of the role played by 
these actors determines the success or failure of peace processes. 
 
As seen, theories presented here rarely focus on preferences of implementers 
themselves or the conditions that influence these preferences. They restrict their 
explanations to third-party intervention or details about the conflict environment 
including availability of resources to sustain fighting. However, they do not see the 
relation between these factors and actors’ decision making. As Stedman mentions in 
spoiler theory it is important to structure the connection between actors’ 
preferences and conflict environment so that one could understand the reason for 
success/failure of peace (Stedman, 1996). To this end, the following chapter presents 
the main argument of the thesis arguing that of the actors’ itself potential to stall 
peace by mentioning the connection between their interests and the conflict 
environment. In the case study chapter the theory will be assessed. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SPOILER THEORY AND FAILURE OF PEACE PROCESSES 
 
Peace studies have grown since the end of the Second World War. In the second half 
of the 20th century, the new paradigms gradually emerged including studies focusing 
on civil wars and armed conflicts between states and armed groups. Civil wars, rather 
than inter-state wars caused 90 percent of deaths between the years 1990 and 2002 
(Tonge, 2014). In parallel with globalization, the distinction between state and non-
state, and between internal and international has disappeared (Kaldor, 2013). Non-
state actors, such as armed groups, jihadist groups, and warlords have been 
important parties in conflicts all around the world. These actors come up with new 
goals based on identity and ideology rather than focusing on material goals such as 
territory or natural resources only. Within this complex picture of contemporary 
wars, peace come to involve as more than the mere absence of war. Johan Galtung, 
editor of Journal of Peace Research, has coined the new term “positive peace” which 
means resolution of conflict through reconstruction of relationships in addition to 
providing absence of violence (Galtung, 1996).  
 
In an ongoing conflict, conflicts begin to de-escalate when parties come to a point of 
“mutually hurting stalemate” (Zartman, 2005). Then, a peace process is initiated by 
conflicting parties or a third party in order to resolve the conflict and prevent its 
recurrence. Nicole Ball divides peace process into two stages: cessation of conflict 
and peacebuilding. For the cessation of conflict, negotiations that bring about the 
signing a peace agreement are crucial. The next stage is the consolidation of peace 
through the implementation of the commitments of the parties in the peace 
agreement, and the promotion of the social reconciliation (Ball, 2001). Not all peace 
processes end in success.  In peace processes, success of spoilers like political actors 
or armed groups is important because they undermine ongoing peace talks via 
violence and stealth methods. When spoilers succeed, a peace process has no chance 
of being implemented or maintained. When they use violence and terrorism, distrust 
between parties increases. Communication between parties disappear because of 
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this lack of trust. This process causes parties to lose credibility and undermines 
further negotiations. Therefore, spoilers feel free not to commit to peace accords. 
Two factors are important in encouraging spoilers to undermine peace processes: 
capabilities and opportunities (Darby & Mac Ginty, 2008). In terms of capabilities, an 
increase in the resources of armed groups and in terms of opportunities, the absence 
of effective spoiler management encourage parties to continue fighting besides, and 
to fail to fullfill their obligations in peace processes. In such cases, the implementation 
of peace could not be achieved and the peace process fails. To understand better the 
threat spoilers pose to the implementation of peace, the next section explains the 
concepts of spoiler and peace implementation.  
 
2.1. Spoilers and Peace Processes 
2.1.1. Spoiler Types and Spoiling 
Earlier research on spoilers proceeded from the basic assumption that peace is made 
through peacemaking sponsored by an international third party. The peace processes 
that result generally include liberal peace understanding containing good 
governance, constitutional democracy, rule of law, justice, economic development 
and protection of human rights (Newman & Richmond, 2006).  Any actor who 
undermines this process of liberal peacemaking is called spoiler (Ibid). However, 
peace processes require more than economic and political reconstruction. They also 
have a socio-psychological aspect. Peace processes challenge the reality of conflict 
through which the communities involved in a conflict sustain hostilities (Bar-Tal, 
2013). Actors who want a conflict to continue might confront to peacemakers. These 
actors are spoilers “who are either individual political actors or political groups that 
use violence or non-violent means to destroy a peace process preferred by the 
majority and in so doing jeopardize peace efforts” (Elman & Gored, 2012). Spoilers 
can be states, non-state actors or even an individual in a group that is party to the 
conflict. These spoilers can use several tactics to jeopardize peace talks. Beyond a 
violent attack they can use non-violent means to stop the process. A peace process 
requires a change in who is viewed as an “enemy”; and spoilers can shape the 
perspectives of people towards peace. For example, after Camp David summit in 
2000 between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Chairman Yasser 
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Arafat, the “no Palestinian partner for peace” motto of Barak is an example of non-
violent means for spoiling peace (Bar-Tal, 2013). Such cases show that violence is not 
necessary for spoiling peace. Actors who want to disrupt peace talks may apply such 
methods as persuasion or inciting an ethnic community in a way to increase its ethnic 
consciousness. Regarding Turkey- the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) peace process, 
the October 6-8 incidents, where Kurds in Turkey took to the streets to protest 
Turkey’s inaction following ISIS overrun Syria’s Kobane, undermined the positive 
atmosphere and broke confidence of the Kurdish community towards the Justice and 
Development Party (JDP) government’s commitment to peace (Köse, 2017). 
Selahattin Demirtaş, the head of the People’s Democracy Party (HDP) called for mass 
anti-government protests that resulted in more than fifty deaths (ibid). This case of 
the October 6-8 incidents deepened distrust between the parties of the peace 
process (Akbaba, 2014).  
 
Spoilers may be totally opposed to peace, but they can also jeopardize peace 
attempts even in cases where they seem willing to reach a peaceful end to a conflict. 
They may do this in two ways: by rejecting agreements or by entering negotiations 
but failing to fullfill their obligations (Stedman, 1997). To understand different kinds 
of spoilers, Stedman proposes three categories of spoilers with different goals. First 
one is limited spoilers who make a deal to meet basic group needs such as recognition 
and secutiy. Second, total spoilers, who refuse to compromise their demands but 
involve in a peace process because of tactical reasons. Third, greedy spoilers, who act 
according to cost-benefit calculations and thus, instance, decide whether or not to 
continue violence based on what they think will bring more benefits to them 
(Stedman, 1997).  
 
Limited Spoilers 
Limited spoilers are those who are willing to negotiate with their limited demands, 
such as recognition, security and power sharing (Stedman, 1997). If their demands 
are met, they do not pose any threat to the peace process. They are the least 
dangerous type of spoiler in terms of their commitment to the peace deal. They have 
limited goals, such as the meeting of basic grievances, recognition of identity, power-
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sharing guaranteed by reforms, a new constitution and guaranteeing security for all 
groups (Stedman, 1997). In Turkey, political parties from the Kurdish Nationalist 
Movement (KNM)9 may be given as examples of limited spoilers because they have 
limited goals such as representation of their ethnic community in a democratic way 
and they have limited capacity to spoil peace. Political parties such as former Peace 
and Democracy Party (BDP) and the Peoples Democratic Party (HDP) have the mission 
to represent the rights of the Kurdish minority in a democratic way. They also have 
limited capacity to spoil peace because they cannot pose a threat by using violence. 
Still, they have played a role in decelerating the peace process in Turkey. This thesis 
focuses on the period after 2012, during which the BDP- the HDP were the main 
political organizations representing the Kurdish National Movement matter here. 
Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ (co-chairs) announced the HDP as a political 
party representing Turkey rather than a Kurdish political movement, yet; they failed 
to distance party to the PKK (Akşam, 2015). After Murat Karayılan’s call to Kurds on 
October 5, 2014, to protest Kobani incidents, Demirtaş announced the same call on 
October 6, 2014 (Milliyet, 2016). Members of the HDP began to accuse the 
government of backing ISIS against Kurds living in the cantons of Syria (Ibid). The 
HDP’s rhetoric escalated tensions and contributed to a decline of trust between the 
government and Kurdish Nationalist Movement in peace talks.  
 
Total Spoiler 
This type of spoiler has a certain goal and insists on achieving that goal. Total spoilers 
may use force to pursue their own goals instead of compromising with the other 
party. They do not intend to integrate into a peace process completely. They continue 
to keep their main preferences hidden and continue to increase their military 
capabilities in order to gain upper hand for forthcoming fights (Stedman, 1997). The 
Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (CDR), a right-wing Hutu group emerged as 
a total spoiler in the time of the Arusha Peace Accord between the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front and President Juvenal Habyarimana (The UN, “www.un.org”). The CDR began 
to assassinate moderate Hutus and peacekeepers during the implementation of the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
9 This concept refers to all political organizations, terrorist organiztaions (PKK) and affiliated groups 
such as YDG-H. 
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peace accord besides, and many Tutsis were killed (Reuters, “Rwandan convicted of 
killing Belgian Peacekeepers”, 2007). The killing of the Belgian peacekeepers and 
civilians triggered a genocide in which thousands of Tutsis and moderate Hutus were 
killed. The CDR is an example of a total spoiler because even the threat of withdrawal 
by the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) did not prevent the CDR from 
destroying the peace process in Rwanda. In case of Turkey, for example It did not 
withdraw its forces from Turkey even though it promised to withdraw its forces to 
Iraq. The PKK continued to train youth forces such as the Patriotic Revolutionary 
Youth Movement (YDG-H) (Yanmıs, 2016). 
 
Greedy Spoiler 
Greedy Spoilers’ goals change depending on the situation. They can expand targets 
in accordance with their cost-benefit calculation, but they are willing to compromise. 
Even though they want peace like limited spoilers, they can turn into a total spoiler 
(Stedman, 1997). It is important to note that different types of spoilers may differ in 
their goals and motivations in spoiling a peace process. Spoiling behavior may result 
from a change in balance of power due to domestic or regional developments. Such 
a change may improve capability of groups who are intent on spoiling peace. In 
addition, the absence of third parties provides these groups opportunities to spoil 
peace processes because there is no powerful mechanism capable of managing 
spoilers.   
 
2.2. Peace Implementation  
Peace implementation definitions in the literature take peace agreement as the 
starting point and the legal basis of implementation (Stedman, 2003; Darby & Mac 
Ginty, 2008). In this minimalist view, peace implementation means compliance with 
a basic written agreement (Zahar, 2011). Implementation is about whether or not 
parties fulfill requirements of a peace agreement. There is also a comprehensive view 
of peace implementation, and that is the view adopted in this thesis. On this view, 
peace implementation is more than carrying out a written text. It is a process where 
long-term peace-building goals are performed such as addressing the root causes of 
conflict through reconciliation and post-conflict economic, social and political 
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reconstruction (Lederach, 1997). It is a part of “the forging of meaningful long-term 
relationships between former enemies” (Stedman, 2003 (eds) Darby & Mac Ginty, 
2008). While government officials continue to negotiate, non-state actors seek to 
introduce peace to the public.  
 
Peace implementation requires carrying out certain number of tasks (Von Hehn, 
2011):  
Planning and Strategy; Planning and strategy must be provided so that the players of 
the peace process can systematically understand how to implement peace (Ibid). All 
of the actors who are engaged in a conflict must be included in the planning of a 
peace strategy. The main actors and mediators involved in planning must consider 
the grievances of the parties to the conflict. Parties may apply to an international 
body or state to observe and mediate planning of implementation. For example, 
following the Dayton Agreement in 1995, a Peace Implementation Council was set up 
to oversee the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement with the goals of 
managing foreign assistance for Bosnia and Herzegovina in cooperation with the 
Office of High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Office of the High 
Representative, “www.OHR.int”).  
 
Cooperation and Coordination; All players must act in a cooperation with each other. 
There might be several sectors that need to be reconstructed, such as the economic, 
security and political spheres. In addition, a peace process involves several types of 
actors including states, non-state and international actors. A coordination body may 
be established to work in cooperation with these actors. This body can monitor 
whether or not actors comply with the overall peace strategy (Ibid).  
 
Dialogue; This is the most important aspect of peace processes because it is the first 
stage where parties recognize each other. Dialogue must be maintained so that the 
communication that began during negotiations can contain. Secretly or not dialogue 
is essential to building trust between the parties holding peace talks. Parties develop 
a mutual perspective to create a peace agreement and maintain it. When the 
dialogue process is cut it makes it more likely for parties to continue to use violence. 
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For example, in the Turkey-PKK case when political leaders from the JDP government 
recognized the Kurdish issue as an important matter in Turkish politics and they 
recognize Kurdish identity, the JDP government initiated the beginning of dialogue in 
2009 (Yeğen, 2015). In response to this initiative Murat Karayılan stated that the PKK 
was ready to engage in dialogue with the government (Ibid). Dialogue between the 
PKK leaders and the government continued untill President Erdoğan said “The 
process is frozen” (Sabah, “Erdoğan: Çözüm Süreci”, 2015). In 2014, Öcalan lastly met 
representatives of Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). However, following the Suruc 
attacks on July 20, the dialogue process ended.  
 
Conflict Transformation and Resolution; This is the understanding that peace is 
connected with justice and human rights (Von Hehn, 2011). Conflict Resolution 
strategy sees the peace process as building a new relationship between adversaries. 
This strategy comes up with problem solving and negotiation (Ibid). In problem-
solving, parties who have divergent interests agree to find a solution that is 
acceptable to all stakeholders. They try to meet on collective interests regarding the 
main issues in the conflict (Pruitt&Kim, 2014).  Parties may reach a settlement if they 
succeed in problem-solving (Ibid).  
 
These efforts occur in parallel with peace-building strategies like reconciliation; 
truth, justice and accountability (Ibid). They cannot be separated from the peace-
building process through which conflicting parties change their perceptions of each 
other and develop new relationship based on forgiveness (Lederach, 1997).  
 
Reconciliation; means repairing the relationship between the parties to a conflict 
(Pruitt&Kim, 2014). In contemporary conflicts what is needed is to address the real 
dimensions of conflict such as feelings of hatred, prejudice and resentment that 
sustain conflict (Lederach, 1999). Reconciliation requires giving voice to the feelings 
of conflicting parties so that the relationship between them can be restored. 
Reconciliation is important beyond the agreement for peace. Settlements can stop 
conflict yet; they are prone to derail especially in case where spoilers are active (Pruitt 
& Kim, 2014). If reconciliation is carried out, settlements are likely to survive (Ibid).  
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Parties in the peace process must consider reconciliation which is the social side of 
creating sustainable peace so that, “the process does not become derailed” 
(Hampson, 1996). There are four requirements for reconciliation: truth, forgiveness, 
justice and peace (Lederach, 1999). Truth means to acknowledge and make visible all 
of the past experiences of victims and victimizers (Ibid). Truth is important in 
reconciliation because it prevents feelings of resentment for the next generations. 
Forgiveness prevents victims from acting in vengeance. Justice is linked with 
punishing victimizers as well as giving victims a chance for being recovered. Finally, 
peace requires focusing on the future by moving beyond conflict (Pruitt&Kim, 2014).  
Peace implementation legally starts with a peace accord. Within this context there 
are three types of peace agreements (Von Hehn, 2011). First, pre-negotiation 
agreements are for scheduling the structure of the negotiations. They determine 
when and how negotiations will be held in terms of location, participants and goals 
(Anderlini, “inclusive security.org”, 2004). The aim of pre-negotiation agreements is 
to build confidence and prepare parties for dialogue (Ibid). However, this process 
may fail to turn into negotiation talks. For example, in 1999 in Colombia, the dialogue 
process that was initiated by civil society organizations’ collecting 10.000 signatures 
could not lead to negotiations and collapsed even though the dialogue process 
determine the future steps regarding negotiations (Ibid). Similarly in Turkey, after 
Öcalan’s Newruz letter was read to the public in Newruz celebrations the PKK 
declared a ceasefire on March 23, 2013 (DPI-Democratic Progress Institute, 2013). 
Furthermore, Murat Karayılan announced that in May, the PKK would start 
implementing the first phase, withdrawal, of the three-phased agreement between 
the government and Öcalan (BBC, “Murat Karayılan announces”, 2013). This three-
phased agreement included:  
 
-The withdrawal of PKK militants from Turkey’s borders 
-Democratic reforms by the government 
-Integration of the PKK militants into political and social life (DPI-Democratic Progress 
Institute, 2013). 
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Although some militants began to leave Turkey in May, the government expected a 
full withrawal (Al Monitor, “Turkey’s Kurdish Road Map”, 2013). The PKK then 
accused the Government of not implementing the second phase and announced that 
it would stop its withdrawal (Al Jazeera, “What is the next”, 2015). The three-phased 
solution map was never implemented completely. Although governmental officials 
conducted a negotiation with Öcalan and other parts of the Kurdish National 
Movement such as the KCK, the PKK, and political parties the process ended up with 
the PKK’s murder of two police officers in Ceylanpınar (NTV, “Cumhurbaşkanı 
Erdoğan’dan”, 2015).  
 
Second, interim agreements seek to get parties to agree on a certain number of issues 
rather than providing a final agreement (Von Hehn, 2011). Third, framework or 
substantive agreements are the agreements that seek to resolve issues by addressing 
all of the interests of disputants. Examples of these include the 1998 Belfast 
Agreement in Ireland, and the 2005 Memorandum of Understanding in Aceh (Ibid).   
As for the actors of peace implementation, the greatest role belongs to international 
actors as custodians who manage the process; this is because they have the capacity 
to force the parties of the peace process to keep their promises (Stedman, 1997). As 
many scholars have mentioned in the peace literature international actors are crucial 
for peace implementation (Stedman, 1997; Hampson, 1996; Walter, 1997). However, 
central governments can also play an important role by legitimizing the process of 
making peace with terrorist groups in the public eye. In addition, it is state officials 
who set up institutions so that the implementation process is successfully completed 
(Von Hehn, 2011). For example, in the beginning of the Resolution Process in Turkey, 
the Commission of Solution Process was established in 2013 for three months (NTV, 
“Çözüm Süreci Komisyonu”, 2013). The commission which included parliamentaries 
from the JDP and the BDP had the mission to observe the course of peace process as 
well as searching for a way for reconciliation (CNN Türk, 2013). In addition to central 
government, non-state actors such as NGOs, civil society organizations and respected 
leaders contribute to implementation in a way that rebuilds relations in society (Ibid). 
All these actors are responsible for implementing peace, especially following the 
signing of a peace agreement.  
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2.3. Spoilers and Peace Implementation 
After overcoming psychological barriers to peace, parties begin to conduct 
negotiations in public. After the public is convinced that communication with 
“terrorists” is necessary to reaching peace, a normalization process in which both 
public and political agents are involved begins. All segments of society including 
scholars, journalists, civil society members and artists begin to discuss how to solve 
the conflict. During this process, the government and armed group members are 
meant to agree on a settlement to be implemented. Both parties are responsible for 
carrying out what the terms of the agreement. At that point, according to Stedman, 
three steps should be given priority: The first is to demobilize the soldiers of the 
armed group. The second is to implement long term peace-building efforts with 
democratic reforms, disarmament, and the establishment of peace at a local level 
through civil society organizations (Von Hehn, 2011: 41). As for the third one, the 
most important thing is to overcome the threat of spoilers who would prevent the 
implementation of the other two steps (Ibid). It is important to realize that the peace 
climate can be spoiled by some actors who desire a better deal. Even if there is a 
compromise between parties, this compromise may be hurt by spoiler attacks. 
Spoiler attacks occur when the balance of power changes in favor of one of the 
groups; the group that gains relative power make a choice if they will continue their 
efforts for peace or not and generally becomes more prone to pose a threat to the 
peace deal (Greenhill & Major, 2006/2007). Changes in the balance of power may be 
caused by domestic, regional or international developments. For example, following 
the rise of the PYD’s power in Syria the PKK improved its military and latent 
capabilities. It has received both military and political support from the international 
community because it has fought against ISIS. The PKK and its affiliate People’s 
Defence Units (YPG) in Syria has emerged as a partner of the United States against 
ISIS (Bradley & Parkinson, WSJ, “America’s Marxist Allies”, 2015). A Kurdish official 
from Kobani said “We are working together and it’s working” (Ibid). Thus, the PKK 
expanded its power as a US partner against ISIS in Syria. All of these developments 
helped the PKK to cheat in commtment to peace deal. The rise of the PKK’s strength 
was followed by escalation of terrorist attacks in Turkey in parallel with a return to 
aggressive rhetoric. They accused the government of supporting an ISIS massacre 
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against Kurds living in Kobani, Syria (Birgün, “Cemil Bayık”, 2015). Inculpatory 
discourse towards the government during ISIS’s Kobani takeover decreased the trust 
between groups, and between Kurds and the government by creating the impression 
that the government allowed the murder of Kurds by backing ISIS (Köse, 2017). 
Beyond the conflict escalatory discourse, the rising capabilities of the PKK 
encouraged the militants to spoil peace via violent attacks. Furthermore, the PKK 
continued to train youth groups like the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement 
(YDG-H) to commit attacks in urban areas. In such an atmosphere, peace 
implementation is not possible. Thus, the peace process came to end in 2015 after 
the PKK killed two police officers in Ceylanpınar, Şanlıurfa (Ibid).  
 
As seen above, the groups who are involved in a peace process may alter the course 
of the process through violence or non-violent means. In so doing, the groups are 
motivated by different issues that can influence the peace environment. At that 
point, it is important to what extent spoilers can succeed in spoiling activities. The 
next part explains what the main drives of spoilers are in spoiling peace.  
 
2.4. Catalyzers of Spoiling: When Spoilers Succeed? 
In Stedman’s terminology of spoiling, there are three main motivations through 
which actors might resume violence. First one is fear of loosing the feeling of security. 
Parties to peace deal might consider a peace agreement as a threat to their presence 
(Stedman, 1997; Walter&Snyder, 1999). Second, parties may have a greedy 
perception towards peace process since they want to have a stronger position to get 
what they want. Third, parties, total spoilers, who are prone to change their 
perception of peace are motivated by desire to gain more under the circumstances 
of war rather than as in peace (Stedman, 1997). Given the motivations of spoilers, 
before implementing peace accords, custodians (international or local actors who 
have a mission to observe peace process) have to consider possible changes in 
preferences of combatants that may easily decide to return to the battlefield 
(Pearlman, 2008/2009). Changes in perceptions ocur when there are capabilities and 
oportunities that make them believe they will gain more in war more than they will 
in peace. While “capability” represents available resources “opportunity” is the 
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absence of control mechanism to manage spoilers. This mechanism could be an 
international or local actor who acting to maintain peace.  
 
Capabilities can be defined as the material or non-material resources available to a 
would-be spoiler. Spoilers recalculate the costs and benefits of peace agreement 
according to the shift in these capabilities that can be classified as military and latent 
capabilities (Greenhill&Major, 2006/2007). If there is a change in capabilities and a 
group comes to believe that it could gain more through violence than through peace, 
then the peace process will suffer. This change can result from a rise in military or 
latent capabilities. Military capabilities are territories, natural resources, or other 
objects of value an actor has taken. Latent capabilities are having access to foreign 
aid from diaspora communities, international actors, or regional offshoots of armed 
groups (Ibid). Figure 2.1 shows the emergence of spoilers based on a shift in 
capabilities. 
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Figure 2.3. Probability of Spoiler Emergence and Predicted Level of Greed for a Given 
Distribution of Power (Greenhill & Major, 2006/2007) 
 
This figure shows that the stronger a party is the greedier they are. For example, 
Angola’s peace process and shift in the National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA)’s commitment to the Becesse Peace Accord in 1991 is an example of 
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a capability-based view of spoiling. After the UNITA discovered diamond mines, 
power shifted toward the UNITA. In 1993 it controlled 70% of the area’s diamond 
mines and Savimbi, the leader of the group, pushed Angola back to war (Greenhill 
&Major, 2006/2007). Regarding capabilities, a group’s regional network is also an 
important source of capability (Darby & Mac Ginty, 2008). If there is a regional linkage 
that provides financial and military aids to groups, they improve their capacity and 
therefore, sustain armament. For example, military aid coming from Kurdish militant 
groups in Syria and Iraq contributed to a shift of power toward the PKK. Ahmet Türk, 
the ex-deputy of the BDP said that the situation in Syria and Iraq helped the PKK 
survive and that because of their help it was not possible to complete disarmament 
(Sputnik, “Türk: Suriye ve Irak”, 2017). This shows that the Syrian civil war and PKK 
offshoot PYD and YPG helped the PKK to consolidate its military power. While the PKK 
was convinced to participate in a peace dialogue in 2012 following its defeat by state 
forces, it escalated violence through urban warfare in parallel with the rise of the PYD 
in Syria (Yeşiltaş & Özçelik, 2016).  
 
Opportunities, the second factor catalyzing spoilers to disrupt peace can be found in 
the absence of third party mediation in a peace process (Darby&Mac Ginty, 2008). A 
third party during peace implementation forces armed groups to take the necessary 
steps for disarmament (Ibid). A peace guarantor is required so that spoilers become 
less dangerous for the peace process. The existence of a credible third party helps 
establish trust between adversaries and makes it possible to monitor parties’ 
compliance with their obligations. For example, in February 2015, a meeting was held 
between the HDP members and Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan in 
Dolmabahçe Palace to negotiate about the future of the resolution process (Köse, 
2017). This meeting was called Dolmabahçe Agreement included Öcalan’s road map 
composed of 10 articles (Ibid). This is known as the Dolmabahçe Agreement of 28 
February, 2015 (Al Jazeera Türk, “Ortak Açıklamanın Tam Metni”, 2015). However, 
Duran Kalkan who is a senior commander of the PKK, denied the claims that the PKK 
will lay down arms. He said that “the PKK wont lay down arms, the Turkish state 
should disarm” (Youtube, “PKK Commander Duran Kalkan”, 2015). A year later, 
President Erdoğan rejected the Dolmabahçe agreement in his speech in Adana on 24 
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April 2016 (Milliyet, “Erdoğan: Dolmabahçe Mutabakatı”, 2016). Hence, Dolmabahçe 
Agreement failed. The process of Dolmabahçe Agreement have been managed better 
if there have been an independent body that could push the parties to implement 
their obligations in terms of the agreement. The Dolmabahçe Agreement failed 
because it was not monitored by an independent third party (Ibid). The HDP accused 
the government of undermining the peace process by denying the agreement. On the 
other hand, the government accused the HDP of coming up with new demands 
without carrying out previous agreement (Ibid). In the presence of a third party, the 
cost of returning violence increases because groups know they will be punished if 
they use violence. Thus, they remain loyal to peace.  
 
If there is a third party whose task is to protect peace, spoilers can be managed. 
However, cases such as Bosnia and Rwanda in which the UN as the third party failed 
to manage spoilers show that the mere presence a third party is not sufficient. The 
use of effective spoiler management strategies is needed as well. These strategies 
are inducement, socialization and coercion (Stedman, 1997).  
 
Inducement 
Inducement strategy requires addressing the grievances that cause the conflict. 
Parties of the conflict may demand recognition, protection and justice (Stedman, 
1997). When these demands are met they might be convinced to fulfill their 
commitments to the peace deal. This method may be enough if a spoiler is limited. 
Spoilers may legitimize their actions by saying that they want recognition, justice and 
protection of their rights. At this point, custodians have to meet the basic demands 
that can be used as means for legitimization by spoilers. In the peace process of 
Turkey, the government took many steps in terms of human rights such as removal 
of discrimination in terms of languages, including allowing TV broadcast in Kurdish, 
allowing people to use Kurdish names, and allowing Kurdish defendants to use their 
mother tongue in court. These steps were important in the sense that the 
government showed it recognized Kurdish identity and left no place for 
discrimination. However, even though the government took these steps, the Kurdish 
National Movement insisted on accusing the government of not taking the required 
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steps for the peace process (Al Jazeera Türk, 2015). Similarly, the KCK blamed the 
government for stopping the withdrawal of the PKK forces (Radikal, 2015). At that 
point, there was not independent mechanism to convince the Kurdish National 
Movement to complete the disarmament process by meeting KNM’s demands.  
 
Socialization 
This strategy is about integrating non-state militants into civilian and political life 
(Hofmann&Schneckener, 2011). Under this strategy, armed groups are forced to 
integrate into political and social life and potential spoilers are forced to accept and 
respect the norms of the peace process (Stedman, 1997). Spoilers incorporated into 
an institutional system that contains providing services in terms of human rights, 
good governance and accountability and that aims to improve commitment to these 
norms. In Mozambique, inducement and socialization were carried out together and 
custodians succeed in bringing the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), 
which was a militant organization in Mozambique founded being independent from 
Portugal, to table again. After the RENAMO and the government signed a peace 
agreement in 1992, the RENAMO did not follow through and implement the 
agreement. The UN peacekeepers legitimized the RENAMO and its leader Dhlakama. 
RENAMO integrated to political life as a political party. In return, the party funded by 
the UN. The system of reward in terms of the socialization strategy worked out in 
Mozambique and RENAMO was convinced to meet its obligations (Ibid).  
 
Coercion 
Coercion refers to deterring by using force or threating to use force 
(Hofmann&Schneckener, 2011). There are two versions of coercion strategy: 
Departing Train and Withdrawal. Departing Train basically means that the peace train 
will go in any case even is some actors are left behind. Even though some actors 
attempt to spoil the peace process, the third party who would protect peace must 
manage the implementation of the peace agreement. For example, armed groups 
may try to stall elections but custodians must establish a ground for carrying out 
elections anyway. This strategy can be exemplified in Cambodia when the Khmer 
Rouge stalled demobilization and disarmament (Stedman, 1997). At that time, the 
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UN took responsibility for ensuring the KR complied by threatening to use force 
against them (Ibid). The UN representative Akashi met mediators from Thailand and 
China to find a solution to manage the spoiling activities of the KR (Ibid). As a result, 
the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia UNTAC deployed armies against all 
potential spoilers (Ibid). The UNTAC prepared a schedule for elections even though 
the KR would not participate. Furthermore, China and Thailand agreed on the 
Security Council Resolution to impose economic sanctions on the KR (Ibid). Finally, 
despite attacks by the KR elections carried out in Cambodia in 1993 (Ibid). 
 
In Withdrawal strategy, third parties who are responsible for managing the peace 
process can threaten to withdrawal support from combatants. The deterrent effect 
of these strategies, especially the use of coercion, shows spoilers the risks of 
returning to violence. In addition to preventing further violence, keeping combatants 
loyal to the peace deal is another important thing. Inducement and socialization play 
a role here. The demands of groups must be given voice through institutionalized 
form of norms (Darby & Mac Ginty, 2008). This brings about peace not only in the 
short-term, but in the long-term as well. If there is no authority to perform these 
strategies actors’ spoiling behavior has more chance to breach peace because 
spoilers think that they will not face any obstacles and sanctions in case they do not 
comply with the peace accord. 
 
Spoilers pose a threat to peace processes. First, they can easily spoil peace processes 
when there is no third party to make them change decision to spoil the peace process. 
Second, they become more prone to spoiling in case of a power shift toward them 
because of domestic and regional developments. Under these circumstances, actors 
who sign peace agreement act to break peace process. In order to understand how 
they do so, the next section explains the methods of spoiling used by spoilers.  
 
2.5. Strategies of Spoilers 
2.5.1. Use of Violence 
After parties negotiate for a sustainable peace and reach a settlement, actors 
unwilling to continue peace talks may undermine its implementation. If spoilers have 
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the capacity to do so, they may use violence to undermine peace implementation. 
They strategically use violence to prevent parties from negotiating. There are three 
critical things that must be given priority for a successful implementation of peace 
according to Stedman: managing spoilers, demobilizing militants and post-war peace 
building (Darby & Mac Ginty, 2008). By using violence like terrorist attacks, spoilers 
pose obstacles to the implementation of demobilization, post-war reconstruction 
and rebuilding trust among adversaries. If they want the conflict to continue they will 
re-escalate their violent attacks. When they do so, they cause destabilization that will 
disrupt the peaceful atmosphere. For example, Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA) 
acted as a spoiler during the peace process in Spain in the beginning of the 2000s 
(Newman & Richmond, 2006). Moderate people inside the group including ones who 
were more conciliatory were killed (Ibid). It continued assassinations by killing 
politicians, journalists and business people (Ibid). Within this context, as Darby and 
Mac Ginty said the greatest impact of violence on peace processes is destabilizing 
negotiations and thereby leading to a return to conflict again (Ibid). This situation has 
serious consequences in terms of peace implementation. First, violence used by 
spoilers including terrorist attacks during peace processes prevents demobilization 
and disarmament by restricting peacemaker coordination and planning. 
Furthermore, it hampers peace building by destroying trust, hope and empathy 
between parties as well as among members of the public. Because violence 
undermines committment to a peace deal it diminishes trust in groups. Trust is an 
important factor to reach a successful conflict resolution. Parties must stay away 
from activities that create distrust. In this sense, when one groups turn to violence it 
increases distrust in both public and government eyes. Without trust, it is difficult to 
sustain communication and dialogue (Walter, 2002).  
 
Terrorism: One of the tactics used by spoilers is terrorism (Newman & Richmond, 
2006). Some use it to return to armed conflict while some only intend to increase 
power for future bargaining (Ibid). The essential thing is that they aim to change the 
course of the process. What distinguishes terrorism from other types of crimes is it 
has a political goal. In addition, beyond government and state forces, terrorism also 
targets civilians (Ibid). Its basic characteristic is being an asymmetrical attack by the 
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weak against the strong. When an armed group fails to defeat a state through 
conventional means it uses terrorist attacks against state forces and civilians (Ibid).  
Terrorism can be used during all stages of an armed conflict. During the peace 
process, actors acting as spoilers use terrorism especially after a ceasefire or peace 
agreement (Ibid). Terrorist attacks include armed assault, assassinations, 
bombing/expolsions, hijacking, kidnapping, suicide attacks etc (GTD).  
 
 
Figure 2.4. PKK attacks between 2013 and 2015 (Global Terrorism Data) 
 
As seen in Figure 2.2, the PKK carried out terrorist attacks between 2013 and 2015 
during ongoing peace talks. Furthermore, as the chart below demonstrates, it 
escalated bombings and armed assaults targeting police, businesses and civilians and 
abandoned the ceasefire permanently following April 2015 (GTD). 10 
 
2.5.2. Use of Non-Violent Means  
Commitment: Violence is not the only necessary tool for spoiling. Groups who want 
to obstruct peace may find another way of spoiling without using violence. First, after 
entering into a negotiation process and agreeing a settlement, they may not keep 
promises especially in terms of disarmament. This is defined as a non-violent way of 
spoiling (Zahar, 2008). Armed groups may be unwilling to commit to deal for 
                                                                                                                                                                            
10 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2017). Global 
Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd 
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disarmament. Spoilers legitimize their refusal to disarm by stipulating that the 
government take certain steps first. During peace negotiations they may cheat by 
improving their military power by stocking weapons (Stedman, 2008). They keep 
arms reserves for any possible further armed conflict or use the presence of arms in 
bargaining. This happened during the peace talks between the government and the 
PKK in Turkey. The PKK reserved weapons especially through groups such as the YDG-
H that claimed self rule in some provisions of southeastern Turkey. In a television 
interview, President Erdoğan confirmed this by saying, “the PKK used the process to 
stock weapons (Hürriyet, “Erdoğan’dan çapıcı”, 2015). The group used the peace 
process to reconsolidate its military power especially in urban areas (Köse, 2017). 
Arms from offshoot groups in Syria facilitated the rearmament of the PKK. A militant 
from the separatist group YDG-H confessed that they consolidated a ground for an 
urban warfare because they expected the peace process would end. They organized 
almost every cities in Turkey. (The WSJ, “Urban Warfare”, 2015).  
 
Indoctrination: another way to spoil peace without violence. Although peace 
processes are generally conducted by elites they also have a public aspect. Actors 
cannot take steps mindlessly. They have to legitimize their actions. A peace process 
cannot be completed unless it gets the support of the public. Although people are 
suspicious at the early stages of peace talks they are convinced that peace is good for 
all. On the other hand, spoiling actors try to justify their terror attacks through shared 
ideologies and cause. Here, it is possible to claim identity as another issue that helps 
establish a bond between the public and different groups (Stepanova, 2011). This is 
why terrorist groups can be seen as freedom fighters for a specific community that 
shares the same identity. In this sense, spoilers may legitimize the use of terrorism 
even during ongoing peace talks. In so doing they use persuasion and incitement.  
 
Persuasion & Incitement: To understand spoiling behavior, one needs to look at the 
rhetoric used by spoiler groups. They use aggressive rhetoric in speeches or 
interviews in order to spread fear and hatred (Bar-Tal, 2007). They use words in press 
releases as follows: 
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- “dictatorship”  
- “oppressor state”  
 - “fascism”  
- “tyranny”  
- “occupation forces” (Ostendorf, 2013).  
 
They use such words as an act of spoiling the normalization process caused by peace 
talks to spread the idea that nothing has changed. They try to depict the state as a 
threat to human rights. This may be followed by calls for mass street protests against 
the “oppressor state”. Spoiler elites or militant groups may manipulate people’s mind 
and behavior as important figures of the HDP and KCK did in Turkey in 2014. They 
created the sense that the JDP government did not care so much about Kurds’ 
demands (Köse, 2017). This was used as a tool to convinve Kurds living in Turkey to 
believe that the JDP backed ISIS and other Islamic groups fighting Kurds in Syria. This 
situation created distrust among Kurds and the government that would undermine 
the resolution process. Similarly after the murder of dozens of people in Suruç, 
Şanlıurfa the PKK and the HDP used this attack as a propaganda tool to incite the 
Kurdish community. Following the attacks the PKK called on people to join in the 
people’s revolutionary war. Bese Hozat, one of the most important figures in the PKK, 
wrote a newspaper article in Özgür Gündem stating that the new process was called 
a people’s revolutionary war (Berktay, Serbestiyet, “Suruç’un Ardından”, 2015). 
Furthermore, in their Suruç speech, Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ 
condemned the government as responsible for the Suruç attack (Alğan, Serbestiyet, 
“Suruç’tan sonra”, 2015). As can be seen, the HDP and the PKK used this atmosphere 
as a tool to convince people that the government was an ally of ISIS.  
 
2.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, spoilers’ impact in the decline of peace processes was explained. 
Actors who agree on a peace settlement may change the course of the peace process 
if they decide to use violent or non-violent means to disrupt the peace talks. Such 
actors are called spoilers, and they can be categorized as a limited, total or greedy 
spoiler based on their goals and capacities. First of all, when one of the parties 
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decides not continue with talks or to fulfill promises this situation spoils the peace 
process. Second, attitudes and decisions to spoil peace are caused by changes in 
capabilities and opportunities that rise the power of the potential spoiler group. 
Finally, by applying violence and other persuasive means, they stall the peace 
atmosphere. I have given examples of this from the Turkey- PKK case. 
 
After parties agree on a settlement, the implementation of this settlement is 
important in the sense that the peace process becomes long-lasting. However, peace 
implementation not only requires commitment to a written text but also working in 
cooperation with all actors who play a role for maintaining peace, dialogue and 
pursuing reconciliation requirements. Spoilers may destroy these requirements of 
peace implementation through discourse and behavior. They can use violence and 
non-violent means to destroy ongoing peace talks. Spoilers create uncertainity by 
carrying out violent attacks despite a ceasefire and by showing unwilling attitudes by 
using aggressive rhetoric. Parties lose their credibility. In turn, the peace process 
dissolves (Abrahams, 2013). That is why; decisions and attitudes of parties involved 
in a peace settlement are determinant on the success or failure of peace processes. 
In the presence of spoilers, if there is no mechanism to mobilize these spoilers, peace 
has no chance.  
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CHAPTER 3 
COLLAPSE OF PEACE PROCESS IN TURKEY 
 
This chapter aims to demonstrate how an armed group may resume violence in cases 
where its expectations rise in parallel with a shift in the balance of power. In the 
Turkish case, the peace process ended because the decision makers of the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) changed their perceptions about the benefits of peace. The PKK 
broke the ceasefire many times during the peace talks and finally restarted its violent 
attacks in the summer of 2015. To understand better the Turkish case, I carried out a 
content analysis on the statements of the top figures in the PKK and the HDP including 
Cemil Bayık, Hülya Alan (Bese Hozat), Duran Kalkan (Selahattin Erdem), and Selahattin 
Demirtaş, as they are the most important figures who have an influence on the peace 
process. In content analysis, I analyzed about 300 columns/op-eds written by these 
figures and 100 news stories between 2012 and 2016.11 I chose these dates to show 
the discourse within the domestic and regional context. I classified key words in two 
categories as pro-resolution and spoiling. The words coded as pro-resolutionary are 
“negotiation, peace, withdrawal, solution, optimism, democratization, new 
beginning, newroz, and political struggle”. On the other hand, I coded “resistance, 
serhildan, people’s revolutionary war, democratic autonomy, self-administration, 
Kurdish unification, Kobane resistance, Rojova revolution, demobilization politics (of 
the government), assimilation, hostility against Kurds, genocide, ISIS alliance, and 
fascist mentality” with spoiling behavior. Figure 3.1 shows the frequency and 
percentage of chosen words used in the columns/op-eds in years.  
 
Table 3.2. Frequency and percentage table according to content analysis dataset12 
 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Spoiling 118 64,84 622 48,94 1223 77,02 1680 75,11 
                                                                                                                                                                            
11 For Selahattin Demirtaş I analysed interviews of him because he has no columns.  
12 This table was created by the author through the original dataset of content analysis. Please see the 
Appendix 1 for the whole dataset. 
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Table 3.1. (continued) 
Pro-
resolution 
64 35,16 649 51,06 365 22,98 557 24,89 
TOTAL  182 100 1271 100 1588 100 2237 100 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Frequency table according to content analysis dataset 
 
As it is seen in the figure 3.1, the amount of the words related with the spoiling and 
threat of use of violence became more dominant except 2013. Even in 2013, 
frequencies are so close to each other. This chapter explains the end of the Turkey-
PKK peace process in two phases. The chapter begins with a brief explanation of the 
Kurdish issue in Turkish politics, the escalation of armed conflict in Turkey, and 
previous peace attempts prior to the last Resolution Process held at the end of 2012. 
Second, the rise and decline of the last peace process in 2012-2015 is explained by 
taking into consideration how the PKK spoiled the peace process in Turkey by using 
domestic and regional developments. In the conclusion part, I will anlayze if spoilers 
have a role in the failure of peace processes show that actors involved in peace 
processes might spoil peace process themselves.  
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3.1. Historical Background 
3.1.1. Kurdish Issue in Turkish Politics 
In the Ottoman Empire period, the Kurdish issue appeared only as an administrative 
matter. The Ottoman Empire had a multi-ethnic structure where all ethnic groups 
had self-rule to a certain extent. People were identified by religion rather than 
ethnicity. The ethnic problems started when the Ottoman Empire adopted 
centralization policies (Yayman, 2011). Naturally, Kurds were unhappy with these 
policies but they remained unified due to a feeling of belonging to Islamic culture 
(Yayman, 2011). The Kurdish issue emerged as an ethnicity issue following the 
Republican period in the 1920s. The 1924 founding constitution of Turkey, recognized 
that Turkey is a place where various ethnic minorities live. Furthermore, there were 
70 Kurdish parliamentaries in the Great National Assembly of Turkey in 1920 (Tunçay, 
1992). However, the Turkish state adopted various implementations that fueled 
ethnic divisions in Turkey. The Republican People’s Party’s efforts to establish a 
nation state identified with being Turk brought about an assimilation policy toward 
minority groups living in Turkey. Government officials such as Abidin Özmen and Fevzi 
Çakmak openly used the word “assimilation” in their reports (Yayman, 2011). The 
state’s perspective on the Kurdish issue moved to securitization. The Eastern Reform 
Program (Şark Islahat Planı) and the Dersim Reform Program (Dersim Islahat Planı) 
were the most important measures taken by the Turkish state against potential 
rebellions of the nationalist Kurdish tribes. Those plans showed Kurds seemed 
rebellious people that must be supressed immediately. Considering Kurds as a 
security threat remained state policy and led to 17 Kurdish rebellions in total in the 
first years of the republican period.  
 
The Republican Period was an important turning point in the sense that social 
narratives including story about the past of the Kurdish population increased the 
awareness of Kurdish ethnic identity. Sharing a common past and traumas 
contributed to the formation of the Kurdish ethnic identity and created the 
psyhological basis for the Kurdish conflict (Volkan, 1998).  
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3.1.1.1. Escalation of the Kurdish Conflict 
The 1980s and the 1990s were the years Turkey saw the highest level of conflict. The 
1990s saw foundation of the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan) and its rapid growth. 
Kurdish students led by Abdullah Öcalan formed the PKK terrorist organization in 
1978 under a Marxist-Leninist political ideology. The PKK consists of an armed wing 
(HPG) and the administration party (KCK). In addition, it created affiliated groups in 
Syria (PYD/YPG), Iran (PJAK/YPK), and Iraq (PKK/HPG) (Alptekin&Köse, 2018). The 
PKK, targeting the Turkish Government launched first attack in 1984. The attack was 
carried out in Eruh, Siirt and left one gendarmerie dead (BBC, “Who are Kurdistan 
Workers”, 2016). In the first years of the PKK, Öcalan was using Syria as a transfer 
point and base as well. Thus, at that time the PKK gained a cross-border character 
that contributed to its fast growth.  
 
As for the 1990s, the state adopted a more aggressive policy to eliminate the PKK. 
The Kurdish question reduced to the PKK and terrorism. The struggle with the PKK 
was not separate from the economic, social and political problems faced by the 
Kurdish population. Hayri Kozakçıoğlu, the governer of the region during the long 
state of emergency, addresses the wrong policy of the state by saying “we considered 
in a same manner all of the intellectuals and writers who speaks on democracy and 
human rights with terrorists” (TESEV, Güneydoğu Sorunu ve Çözüm Arayanları Panel, 
İstanbul, 1992). As understood from Kozakçıoğlu’s statement, the Kurdish issue is 
more than a security matter and, must be considered in a multidimensional way such 
as socio-cultural, economic, as a security matter, and as a political issue 
(Alptekin&Köse, 2018). According to data from the General Staff of Turkey, 11,735 
people, including state officials, security staff, and civilians died in total (Yayman, 
2011).  
 
3.1.1.2. Peace Attempts Before the 2000s 
In President Turgut Özal’s era, the Turkish state first recognized that the Kurdish issue 
is one of the most important problem in the Turkish history and the state had to 
resolve this probem. Özal was the first state official who publicly discussed the 
Kurdish issue in Turkey.  He intended to adopt democratic ways as well as use 
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security-based methods to resolve the Kurdish conflict. “We can discuss about 
federalism as well” he said (Aziz Üstel, Star Gazetesi, 2015). Demirel was another 
Turkish President who had pro-resolutionary perspective to the Kurdish issue in the 
Turkish politics. Demirel’s statement that “Turkey has recognized the Kurdish reality” 
said during a visit to Diyarbakır in 1993 was an important indication that Turkey had 
decided to tackle the Kurdish issue. (Sabah, “Kürt Realitesini Tanıyorum”, 2009).  
 
President Özal had a pro-resolution approach and therefore asked several 
intellectuals to work on the resolution of the Kurdish issue. This was the first time 
Turkey worked to develop a powerful strategy including the foundation of research 
commissions, the reformation of its security staff and bureaucracy, and the 
reconstruction of economic infrastructure in southeast Turkey and so on. Because of 
this new Kurdish policy, the PKK declared a ceasefire on March 17, 1993 (CNN Türk, 
2010). However, the PKK violated the ceasefire by killing 33 Turkish soldiers on the 
Elazığ-Bingöl highway after the death of Özal (CNN Türk, 2010).  After two ceasefire 
announcements in 1995 and 1998, Öcalan was captured in Kenya and arrested. After 
that, the PKK announced its decision to abandon armed struggle in June 1999 
(Yayman, 2011). The arrest of Öcalan and PKK’s renunciation of violence put an end 
to the longstanding war between the Turkish military and the PKK. Turkey entered a 
peaceful process until the PKK resume fighting in 2004.  
 
3.1.1.3. The Kurdish Opening-The 2000s  
In the 2000s, Turkey became a candidate member of the European Union, and a new 
process of reforms began. The Justice and Development Party (JDP) government 
came up with a different approach to Kurdish issue. This different approach was 
articulated in the party program of the AKP. Simply put, the AKP determined three 
phased programs to follow: economy, democratization, and safety measures 
(Yayman, 2011). In parallel with the change in the perception of leaders, the 
government implemented new reforms. On June 9, 2004, TRT, the state television 
broadcasting, launched one-hour broadcasting in Kurdish (Yeğen, 2015). Similarly on 
September 14, 2004, the Turkish state opened Kurdish courses for the first time 
(Ibid). Turkey began to approach the Kurdish question as a matter of democratization 
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rather than as a security issue. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was the first 
state official to accept that the Turkish state has made mistakes in the past, in a 
speech he delivered in Diyarbakır in 2005 (Yeğen, 2015). Erdoğan said, “Ignoring past 
mistakes is not suitable behavior for great states” (Ensarioğlu, 2013). He promised to 
resolve the Kurdish Question (The Economist, 2005). This speech showed that, for 
the second time in Turkish politics since Özal’s period, a government was adopting a 
new approach to the Kurdish issue.  
 
When Erdoğan’s Chief Advisors Ahmet Davutoğlu and Turkish Special Envoy to Iraq 
Murat Özçelik visited the President of Iraqi Kurdistan Masoud Barzani, this was the 
end of Turkey’s containment policy towards the Kurds (Yeğen, 2015). In September 
2008 it was revealed that the Turkish state was holding meetings with Öcalan in Oslo 
that would later be called the Oslo talks (Ibid). The era of optimistic discourse had 
arrived. The chief of the Turkish army, İlker Başbuğ stated “the Turkish nation was 
actually defined in citizenship terms and comprises everyone who built Modern 
Turkey” (Yeğen 2015). In 2009, President Abdullah Gül used the word “Kurdistan,” a 
social and political taboo, for the first time (Habertürk, 2009). On August 2, 2009, the 
minister of domestic affairs, Beşir Atalay, met academics and journalists in a panel on 
modern Turkey and discussed how to resolve the Kurdish issue (Ruşen Çakır, 2011). 
This process, in which the Turkish state publicly recognized the Kurdish problem and 
adopted legal implementations relevant to the Kurdish issue, was named the 
“Kurdish Opening” or “Democratic Opening” (Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2009). In parallel with the new approach with regards to the Kurdish issue, the 
government adopted new amendments to the anti-terror law. New definition of 
terrorism was also developed. Broadcasting in Kurdish language was allowed and a 
new Kurdish language channel TRT 6 was opened. The Turkish Criminal Code was 
reformed using a new approach to penalties. Law on meetings and demonstrations 
(2911) was amended. State security courts were removed. The Jurisdictions of local 
governments were expanded (Yayman, 2011). For the first time in Turkish history, a 
government endorsed structural amendments for the resolution of Kurdish issue. 
During the same period, the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, called a group of PKK 
terrorists to the Habur gate in October 2009 (Sabah, 2009). Kurdish masses and 
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politicians welcomed 34 terrorists who came to surrender to Turkish forces. The 34 
PKK militants came in guerrilla clothes. The government officials said that the arrival 
of terrorists was hopeful, yet, the masses and nationalist politicians reacted to 
celebrations for terrorists. Opposition parties, especially the MHP, were unhappy 
with PKK militants’ entering Turkey with no remorse. Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the 
MHP, accused Erdoğan and the AKP of supporting separatism. Thus, the second phase 
of efforts for establishing peace in Turkey failed. This event known as the Habur 
incident, proved that peace is not an easy business, and that politicians seeking to 
negotiate with terrorists must convince the masses. Peace is not a process that takes 
place only at the level of government officials. Peace is a process that requires public 
support as well as the intention of governmental officials. 
 
3.1.1.4. Rise of Conflict (2011-2012) 
The Oslo Process and the Turkish Intelligence Agency’s talks with Öcalan failed and 
Turkey saw the most violent conflict for years between 2011 and 2012. “Turkey's 
Kurdish conflict is becoming more violent, with more than 700 dead in fourteen 
months, the highest casualties in thirteen years,” according to the report of the 
International Crisis Group, a conflict resolution organization (Coşkun, 2017).13 The 
2011-2012 period were full of attacks carried out by the PKK despite Öcalan’s 
statements in favor of negotiation with the government. Although Öcalan said, “the 
contact with the state is in its final stage; making a deal is a matter of time”, the PKK’s 
kidnappings and attacks continued, as in the Silvan attack, which killed thirteen 
soldiers (Bahar, 2013).  
 
The 2012 was the year of the revival of the PKK, especially following the outbreak of 
the Syrian civil war after the Arab Uprisings in 2011.The Democratic Union Party 
(PYD), which was founded by the PKK in 2003 as its offshoot in Syria, was under 
pressure from the Assad regime until the civil war broke out in 2011. The PYD was 
established with Öcalan’s order to enhance the PKK’s cross-border influence 
(Acun&Keskin, 2017). However, the power vacuum caused by the Arab Uprisings gave 
                                                                                                                                                                            
13“ Turkey and the PKK: saving the Peace Process”, (International Crisis Group, 6 November 2014). 
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a chance to the PYD to gain more power, the PYD thus emerged one of the most 
powerful actors in Syria in a short period of time. The PYD gained authority in Ayn al-
Arab, Hasakah, and Afrin through aids provided by the PKK-KCK (Ibid). The PKK/PYD 
flag was raisen on the Syrian border. On CNN’s global public square, Soner Çağaptay 
a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a GPS coordinator, 
summarized the situation as follows: “As the Turks see it, with identical PKK/PYD flags 
reportedly being raised over Ayn al-'Arab and Afrin, developments suggest that the 
PKK may be creating a haven for itself on Turkey's border with Syria”  (CNN, 2012).  
The rise of the PYD gave the PKK power to continue fighting in Turkey. The PKK also 
learned lessons from People’s Defense Units (YPG) in terms of urban warfare. Taking 
courage from the Syrian war, the PKK increased its attacks and changed its fighting 
strategy (Bahar, 2013). In an interview with CNN, Hugh Pope, the chief executive of 
the International Crisis Group said, “We are seeing the longest pitched battles 
between the army and the PKK. We are seeing a widespread campaign of kidnapping, 
suicide bombings and terrorist attacks by the PKK. They are very much on the 
offensive and unfortunately this is matched by much harder line rhetoric on both 
sides” (CNN, 2012). 
 
  
Figure 3.2. PKK attacks in 2012 (Global Terrorism Database) 
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As seen in Figure 3.2. PKK violence escalated, the PKK also adopted the strategy of 
“hit and stay” in place of “hit and run” (Bahar, 2013). This new strategy of “hit and 
stay” which aims to build “liberated zones” and stand on southeast Turkey, was to 
take the control of the south part of Turkey. PKK was aiming to extent its power in 
Turkey relying on the developments in Syria.  
 
On the other hand, the PKK continued to call on people to carry out hunger strike 
protests. The PKK and the KCK14 prisoners began a hunger strike on September 12, 
2012 in demand of the release of Öcalan and the lifting the ban on the use of Kurdish 
language in public space (BBC Türkçe, 2012). Selahattin Demirtaş, the head of the 
Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) supported the protests by saying “We will organize 
hunger strikes that will start on Saturday in masses” in his meeting with journalists in 
Diyarbakır (Özgür Gündem, “Demirtaş”, 2012). In parallel with the new strategy of 
the PKK, Figure 3.3.15 shows how leaders used anti-resolution discourse that would 
jeopardize trust and dialogue on both sides. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. The Turkey-PKK conflict in 2012; Pro-resolution discourse at 64 (64,5 %) 
and spoiling discourse at 118 (35,5 %) 
                                                                                                                                                                            
14 KCK trials started in 2010 to judge suspects with membership of the Union of the Communities of 
Kurdistan (KCK) which is a non-guerilla organization but controlled by the PKK. 
15 The figures of pro-resolution and spoiling discourse percentage were created by the author. Please 
see the Appendix 1 for the whole dataset of content analysis. 
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As we can see from Figure 3.3. spoiling discourse is more than pro-resolution 
discourse in the year 2012. While leaders of the PKK used spoiling language by 64,5 
%, they use pro-resolution discourse only by 35,5 %. There is so much attention to 
Roboski issue took place in in Şırnak province where smugglers were killed by Turkish 
air strikes by accident in 2011 (Hürriyet, 2012). Writers call on people to take the 
streets. For example, the most frequent word is “resistance” with 39% in 2012. It is 
possible to say dialogue atmosphere has disappeared with the rise in hardline 
rhetoric including accusatory statements against the opposite side. 
 
3.2. The Resolution Process (2012-2015) 
3.2.1. De-escalation of the Conflict and the Start of Dialogue (2012-2013) 
People were killed and wounded in the violent attacks of 2012. Both the state and 
the PKK were fighting each other but at the end of 2012 neither the PKK nor state 
had reached their goals. The PKK could not launch a revolutionary war as it was 
weakened psychologically and militarily. The parties of the conflict were in a situation 
in which they thought they could not win the conflict. This situation provided a great 
opportunity to initiate dialogue between the conflicting parties. Prime Minister 
Erdoğan and founding leader of the PKK Öcalan were the main players who started 
the communication in which both parties said they were ready to hear the other’s 
story (Anderson&Cissna&Arnett, 1994). On December 12, 2012, it was revealed that 
the Turkish National Intelligence Agency (MIT) had been meeting Öcalan to renew 
peace talks since October 2012 (Selvi, “Öcalanla Hakan Fidan Görüştü”, Yeni Şafak, 
2012). Prime Minister Erdoğan publicly announced that Hakan Fidan, the head of 
National Intelligence Agency (MIT) was in contact with Öcalan. He said, “There are 
still some ongoing meetings since we have to obtain some results. If we can see a 
light, we will keep on taking steps for this sake” (Köse, 2017).  As a result, Öcalan took 
the critical move of giving instructions to the KCK prisoners to end hunger strike. 
Hunger strike protests were important contributers to long-lasting conflict and 
division. Öcalan showed his intention to remain in dialogue with the government 
when he instructed prisoners to end these protests. After that, Erdoğan stated, “If 
necessary, state would reinitiate talks with Öcalan” (Ensarioğlu, 2013). Both sides 
intended to maintain communication with one another, which means they started a 
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dialogue in public. As a result, Ahmet Türk, an independent Kurdish MP, and Ayla 
Akat, BDP MP met Öcalan on Imrali Island on January 3, 2013 (Al-Jazeera Türk, “Türk 
ve Akat”, 2013). The first statement came from Selahattin Demirtaş who said, “If Mr. 
Öcalan wishes our party and the deputies to be involved in the process, we will 
certainly support and be involved in the process. Respondents of the call he made 
will be the government, the KCK, the BDP, and us. Will of a permanent solution 
program will receive support from the BDP.” (Özgür Gündem, “Demirtaş”, 2013). This 
statement shows that Öcalan was so important that he had the influence to change 
the perception of leading figures in the PKK concerning the peace attempts.  
 
As seen, there was a resolution process in which the Turkish intelligence was holding 
meetings with Öcalan. The contact with Öcalan also led indirectly to other groups 
such as the HPG, the PKK’s armed wing led by Murat Karayılan and its representatives 
in Europe, the BDP and HDP as political wing and the KCK as on top of all. On the 
other hand, the AKP and MIT were the groups who initiated negotiations. 
  
During the resolution process, there were several meetings with Öcalan. On February 
23, 2013, there was another meeting between the BDP members and Öcalan. Sırrı 
Süreyya Önder, Pervin Buldan, Altan Tan, met Öcalan that was one of the turning 
points in the resolution process. Öcalan and BDP members coordinated a three-
phased roadmap in cooperation with government officials to end the conflict as 
follows: 
-Withdrawal of the PKK militants from Turkey’s borders 
-Democratic reforms by the government 
-Integration of the PKK militants into political and social life (DPI-Democratic Progress 
Institute, 2013). 
 
With this three-phased solution, they developed a pre-negotiation agreement for 
scheduling the structure of the negotiations and determining when and how 
negotiations would be held in terms of location, participants and goals (Anderlini, 
“inclusive security.org”, 2004). In accordance with this agreement, the PKK was 
expected to announce a ceasefire and withdraw from Turkey (Bayar, 2013). This 
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roadmap was welcomed by Kandil16, the BDP and European representatives of the 
PKK. Kandil started to adopt more constructive discourse. They used optimistic 
language about the AKP and the resolution process as we can see in the statement of 
Duran Kalkan, one of the top leaders in Kandil: “There was an obvious change of 
discourse of AKP executives in the last weeks. This change is observed first time since 
Tayyip Erdoğan made a speech in Amed. If the AKP can manage to keep this discourse, 
this will not only decrease the feeling of distrust between the Kurds and the 
government, but also can drastically decrease tension in the Turkish society and 
nationalism.” (Yeni Özgür Politika, 2013).  
 
Following the meetings, the parties were involved in a mutual dialogue process, 
which is essential for building trust among parties who would hold peace talks. 
Parties seemed ready to develop a mutual perspective to create and maintain a 
peaceful solution. Media also served as an instrument to legitimize the process in the 
public eye and to send the messages of actors who had contact with each other. In 
this positive atmosphere, the PKK released eight public officers that it had captured, 
on March 13, 2013 in an important step for the peace process (Hürriyet Daily News, 
2013). “We consider this (the release of hostages) a positive gesture and attitude in 
terms of the [ongoing peace process]. We are glad of that,” said Deputy Prime 
Minister Beşir Atalay on March 12 (Ibid). The positive gestures of the parties reached 
their height when Öcalan sent a letter calling for all to support the resolution process. 
Sırrı Süreyya Önder, deputy of BDP, read the letter of Öcalan during Newroz 
celebrations, a common spring celebration day for both Turks and Kurds, on March 
21, 2013 in Diyarbakır. The letter called for ceasefire and an end to fighting. He was 
saying “We have come to a point today where guns shall be silenced, and thoughts 
and ideas shall speak. A modernist paradigm that ignores, denies and externalizes has 
collapsed. Blood is being shed from the heart of this land, regardless of whether it is 
from a Turk, Kurd, Laz or Circassian. A new era begins now; politics comes to the fore, 
not arms. Now it is time for our armed elements to move outside [Turkey’s] borders.” 
(The New York Times, 2013). With this letter, a new era was starting with no guns and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
16 Kandil is the home base of the PKK where the main PKK camps located in Iraq-Iran border. 
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just ideas. Therefore, Newruz letter can be accepted as a step for building trust 
among parties. Parties were coming to the point where they agree to find a solution 
acceptable to all stakeholders. They tried to meet on collective interests regarding 
the main issues in conflict (Pruitt&Kim, 2014).  After BDP delegation transmitted 
Öcalan’s letter to Kandil, the PKK announced ceasefire on March 23, 2013. The PKK 
declared that they would begin to pull their forces from Turkish soil. In parallel with 
Öcalan’s letter Kandil made deliberate but positive explanations regarding the call for 
withdrawal. “If anyone keeps their promises and do what is necessary, it seems that 
the solution process in the Missle East can start.” said Duran Kalkan who is a senior 
commander in the PKK, in his column on March 25, 2013 (Yeni Özgür Politika, 2013).  
 
Following this reduction in tension, one of the most important steps came. The Wise 
men Committee (Akil İnsanlar Heyeti) was established to include the public in the 
process on April 3, 2013. The Committee was composed of 63 people, including NGO 
representatives, intellectuals, journalists, and artists.17 They were divided into seven 
regions of Turkey. The aim of the Wiseman Committee was to share details of the 
peace process with public and get support of them. Members of the committee 
travelled around Turkey for two months with a busy schedule to provide information 
about the process to listen to the demands of the public especially in the Southeast 
Turkey. The Wiseman Committee completed its visits on June 14 and published a final 
report.18 The committee was designed to develop public dialogue as well as to create 
trust between public and the government about the resolution of the Kurdish issue. 
During the Committee was working on building confidence on public eye, the 
Government was making amendments in laws on Human Rights that would 
contribute to democratization in parallel with the resolution of Kurdish issue. For 
example, on April 30, 2013, the Ministry of Justice declared that 200 KCK prisoners 
had been released in the previous two months (Kaya&Ünal, BİLGESAM, 2013). On the 
other hand, Murat Karayılan, the leader of Kandil, announced that PKK militants 
would begin leaving Turkish lands on May 8. He also requested that the government 
                                                                                                                                                                            
17 See the whole list of Wisemen Committee http://aa.com.tr/en/turkey/wise-men-committee-
members-announced/258996  
18 See the whole report 
http://www.mazlumder.org/webimage/akil%20insanlar%20heyeti%20guneydogu%20raporu.pdf  
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to eliminate special security team systems, and the construction of police stations. 
He also added that PKK’s withdrawal must be followed by the second step, which was 
defined as democratization reforms by the government (Yeni Özgür Politika, 2013).  
 
During the first half of 2013 there was a pro-resolution atmosphere in which the 
government and Öcalan with his group in Kandil, seemed willing to develop peace. 
This willingness can be seen in the discourse used by Kandil and by BDP deputies. As 
we can see in Figure 3.4. leaders in Kandil made mostly pro-resolution explanations 
during the first half of 2013. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Turkey-PKK conflict; pro-resolution discourse at 649 (52,90%), spoiling 
discourse at 622 (47,10%) 
 
This discourse contributed to the building of confidence between the conflicting 
parties and the rise of hope in public for the resolution of the conflict in Turkey. For 
example, the Final Report of Wiseman Committee says people embraced the process 
so, people’s supporting the peace process proves that they had feeling of trust and 
hope. Within this period parties engaged in a dialogue to exchange the ideas about 
the way of the resolution. They de-escalated the conflict by using confidence building 
measures which means efforts for changing ideas of other side and create trust to 
avoid encouraging further conflict (Mitchell, 2000). In parallel with the pro-resolution 
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discourse, the violence reduced during the first half of 2013 as seen in Figure 3.5 The 
PKK launched 21 attacks including armed assault, hostage taking, and 
bombing/explosion in the first half of 2013 (GTD)  
 
Figure 3.5. PKK attacks in 2013 (Global Terrorism Database) 
 
3.3. Weakening of the Process (2013) 
3.3.1. YDG-H  
During this process, while talks with Öcalan and Kandil was going on, the BDP and 
KCK were working to structure a new order in southeastern cities. The media was 
revealing news about the KCK’s tax collection activities and BDP local governments’ 
self-rule attempts. Furthermore, the PKK did not totally stop fighting. On June 2, 2013 
the PKK commenced fire to Turkish soldiers in the Syrian border (Haberler.com, 
2013). At the same time, it was revealed that the PKK was organizing a youth militant 
organization, the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG-H) to fight in cities. 
YDG-H militants were checking identities of the pople living in cities like Hakkari, 
Şırnak, Mardin and Diyarbakır because the security measures became less visible 
(Haber 7, 2013). The PKK sought to move the fight from mountains to cities and the 
YDG-H was commanding a new way of fighting. On July 10, YDG-H posted a video of 
oath taking ceremony of YDG-H militants on twitter (Haberler.com, 2013). Security 
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forces took no action, so as not to endanger the course of the process. Therefore, the 
YDG-H had a great opportunity to train militants and to organize uprisings in cities.19  
 
3.3.2. PKK’s New Strategy and the Rise in Spoiling Discourse 
Within this process, on July 13, 2013 KCK announced a road map that kid at its main 
goals. Under the call for “people’s revolutionary war”, the PKK was aiming to declare 
an autonomous region like the one in Rojava. Murat Karayılan, the head of the KCK 
was replaced by Cemil Bayık who is known as hardline and Hülya Oran (Bese Hozat) 
in the KCK Congress. Following the reshuffle within the PKK, Cemil Bayık warned the 
government to take measures before he ordered to stop the withdrawal. On the 
second anniversary of “the Rojava Revolution”, which is the capture of Afrin, Ayn-el 
Arab (Kobane) and Derik by People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria, aggressive 
discourse began to replace pro-resolution language. For example, Öcalan stated that 
the process would come to an end if the government did not take further steps 
(Kaya&Ünal, BİLGESAM, 2013). Similarly, on August 27, Cemil Bayık threatened to 
stop the pull-out of PKK forces (ibid). Although the presidency declared that the 
Resolution Process must continue, the PKK announced it halted ceasefire because the 
government had failed to complete the second step of the three-phased plan for the 
resolution (Al-Jazeera Türk, 2014).  
 
In the same period, the government announced a Democratization Package. The 
Package included social and political implementations that were vital for the 
continuity of the peace talks. Among these implementations were allowing education 
in mother languages in private schools, removing the discriminatory pledge of 
allegiance, and increasing state aid to political parties which receive more than 3% of 
votes (NTV, 2013). There were other positive developments that gave hope for the 
continuity of the peace process. One of them was meeting Şivan Perwer (Kurdish 
singer) in addition to talks with Mesut Barzani who is the president of Iraq Kurdistan 
Autonomous Region. Barzani’s explanations supporting the peace process in Turkey 
and Perwer’s duet with Ibrahim Tatlıses were symbolic gestures to keep the process 
                                                                                                                                                                            
19 See the demonstration march of the YDG-H in Cizre 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PuIfo1AyNCo  
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alive. However, these gestures could not prevent handling of the peace process. 
Despite Öcalan and governmental officials’ positive messages, the PKK once again 
acted as a spoiler in the process. The thing is that, the writers use pro-resolutionary 
statements yet, there is still high level of stress on resistance. Furthermore, there is 
so much emphasis on Rojova revolution and unification in Kurdistan. Most of the 
texts written in 2013 have aggressive and accusatory language against the 
government about its Syrian policy. For example, while “solution” word was used in 
22%, “Rojova Revolution” was used in 20%.   
 
3.4. Collapse of Turkey’s Peace Process (2013-2014) 
In Turkey’s peace process there were several changes in the domestic context that 
changed the balance of power in favor of the PKK that acted in the way of 
undermining the survival of the peace process.  
 
 
Figure 3.6. Temporal distribution of pro-resolution and spoiling discourse according 
to content analysis dataset 
 
As seen in the figure 3.6. there are specific periods when they increased tension with 
their statements in parallel with armed attacks. These periods coincided with events 
such as the presidential elections and Kobani events known as 6-8 October events in 
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Turkey in terms of domestic issues, and de facto declaration of autonomy of Rojova 
in Northeastern Syria in terms of the regional dynamics. 
 
3.4.1. Domestic Context and Spoiling Activities 
The first event was the Gezi protests which was a wave of demonstrations against 
Erdoğan and his policies. Gezi Protests initially started as an environmental protest 
to protect Gezi Park in June 2013 but turned into a political demonstration led by 
groups opposed to AKP policies. Second, Turkey saw one of the most surprising 
scandals with the December 17 Operations at the end of 2013. The December 17 
appeared as a corruption scandal accusing several high level governmental officials 
of corruption. The AKP and Prime Minister Erdoğan were accused by police led by the 
Gulenist Movement which is a religious movement that infiltrated the state Affairs. 
While the government endeavored to maintain peace talks the December 17 issue 
attracted everyone’s attention. Within this complex political atmosphere contrary to 
expectations Öcalan backed the government by saying “The ones wish this country 
to turn to a fire place again with a military coup should know that we will not carry 
the gasoline to this fire. We will stand against all of the coup attempts as we did in 
the past” during the visit of a BDP delegation to Imrali (Al-Jazeera Türk, 2014). 
Öcalan’s statement proved he was still intended to continue talks with Government. 
Furthermore, he also gave new order to the PKK to maintain pull-out by sending a 
new letter to Kandil via BDP. On the other hand, the PKK and BDP did not follow 
Öcalan’s instructions due to the upcoming local elections held in March, 2014, and 
presidential elections held in August, 2014. During the period of local elections, most 
of the columns written by the administrative wing of the PKK addressed the issues of 
Gezi Protests and December 17 operations launched against the AKP. There was so 
much stress over the December 17 corruption scandal and Gezi Protests as well. They 
intend to attract the attention towards the Gezi events that debilitated the image of 
the government. The BDP was replaced by the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), 
which declared itself as a party of Turkey but used an ethnic nationalist rhetoric 
during the elections. For example, the Heslev protests in Diyarbakır were associated 
with Gezi Protests by Duran Kalkan in his column on March 10, 2014 (Yeni Özgür 
Politika, 2014). Leaders in Kandil and HDP members of parliament began to make 
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speak against Öcalan’s instructions favoring a transition to negotiations with the 
government. Among the statements made before the elections are the discourse of 
spoiling addressing the issues such as new order in the Middle East, Kurdish 
resistance (serhildan), regional autonomy and self rule. Furthermore, they used 
aggressive and hardline rhetoric to delegitimize Erdoğan and the AKP before the 
elections. In contrast to Öcalan’s moderate conciliatary messages, Murat Karayılan, 
head of the HPG said “The Solution Process is in a deadlock. Everybody must know 
that the process is end up with war if the government does not seriously take 
concrete steps” (Al Jazeera Türk, 2014). Simply put, the PKK was threatening the 
government to resume violence on every occasion by taking the advantage of 
political instability in Turkey.  
 
The last development influencing the change of domestic context was the 
presidential elections in 2014. The elections were important in the sense that for the 
first time in Turkey’s history people were able to select directly their president. 
Selahattin Demirtaş was one of the presidential candidates in the August 10, 2014 
presidential elections. Thus, the HDP was making efforts to increase its votes in the 
presidential elections by criticizing Erdoğan. In almost every speech of Selahattin 
Demirtaş one can see many references to past massacres committed by the Turkish 
state. He used to get these votes of the Kurdish population. For example, “Until this 
day, none of the presidents conned his public with the fascism, monism, and racism 
under the cover of democracy. This is his success. Thisis the mystery of Erdoğan.” said 
Demirtaş in a Gaziantep meeting with NGOs (Özgür Gündem, 2014). Meanwhile, the 
opposition parties MHP and CHP claimed that the HDP and the AKP agreed on the 
release of Öcalan before the elections (Aras, 2014). Their claims contributed to 
undermining the peace process because they propagated the fear of separation. As 
a result, election campaigns dramatically increased the tension and undermined the 
trust between the parties involved in the peace process. When all parties 
concentrated on the elections it has been inevitable to ignore establishing peace in 
Turkey. As seen, the perception of peace changed when parties concentrated on their 
gains and expectations. The PKK preferred to stand in provocative position against 
the JDP instead of defusing the tension. 
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3.4.1.2. Regional Context and Spoiling Activities 
While the presidential elections escalated the tension in the domestic context, the 
Syrian war also contributed to the deceleration of the peace process in Turkey. At the 
time when Turkish government held meeting with Öcalan to establish peace in Turkey 
there was a civil war going on in Syria. At the beginning of the Syrian war, Syrian Kurds 
adopted “the third way policy” which was based on remaining neutral between the 
regime and the opposition groups organized under the Free Syrian Army (Tan, 2016). 
The regime’s conflict with the opposition forces provided a great opportunity for 
Kurds in Syria to enhance their authority. There was an armed group called the 
People’s Protection Units (YPG), which is the military organization of Syrian Kurds as 
well as the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is the political party. PYD was a 
political party that was organized by the PKK and KCK in 2003 by Öcalan’s order 
(Brandon, 2007). However, the PYD appeared as a regional power following Syrian 
war. Through the power vacuum caused by ongoing civil war Kurdish forces gained a 
great opportunity to create regional autonomy in Syria. On November, 2013, PYD 
which is headquarted in Qamishli, declared autonomy in the Afrin, Jazira and Kobani 
cantons of Syria (Acun& Keskin, 2017). This was the first important move that showed 
that the Syrian war would give a strong hand to Kurdish forces to become a regional 
actor in the Middle East.  
 
In order to understand how the Syrian war gave hope to the PKK for being a more 
important regional actor, one should look at the organizational structure of the PYD. 
From the foundation of the PYD it has always had links to the PKK. For example, the 
PYD Bylaw says that “The Democratic Union Party (PYD) accepts Mr. Öcalan as its 
leader and the leader of the Kurdish people, and it considers the Kurdistan People’s 
conference (Kongra-gel) the supreme legislative body of Kurdistan’s people” (cited 
by Acun & Keskin, 2017). Furthermore, the leaders of the PYD’s organizational 
structure were appointed by the KCK. Apart from that, in his interview Osman Öcalan, 
the brother of Abdullah Öcalan, stated as follows: 
“The PYD is connected to the PKK, and acts upon on PKK orders. We founded the PYD 
in Kandil. We held the first general PYD congress in October 2003. We trained the 
cadres in Kandil” (Yahya, “the PYD& the PKK”, The Hill).   
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Given the kinship between the PYD and the PKK, one can conclude that it was 
inevitable that the Syrian war would have an influence on the PKK’s intention to 
peace process. The PYD’s achievement in Syria encouraged the PKK to push to 
become a power in the Middle East. The The PKK already started to change its 
strategy of fighting but regional context motivated PKK by raising its expectations. 
Furthermore, the emergence of ISIS offered an environment in which the PKK could 
legitimize its use of force. Within this context, there are two turning points 
concerning the regional context that pushed the PKK to change its perception of 
peace. One of them was the PYD’s declaration of regional autonomy in Rojava. The 
second one was Kobani’s occupation by ISIS.  
 
3.4.2.1. Rojava Incident and Spoiling of Turkey’s Peace Process 
On January 21, 2014 Kurdish-based TV channel Rudaw announced that the Kurds had 
declared autonomy in Rojava, on Twitter (Rudaw English on Twitter, 2014). An 
autonomous Rojava region was governed by the PYD, which is the Syrian offshoot of 
the PKK. This created hope for the KCK. Therefore, the autonomy of Rojava region 
was presented by KCK leaders as a model for Kurds in Turkey. They put stress on 
“Rojava revolution” in their speeches, columns and interviews. They meanwhile 
adopted accusatory language against the AKP by stating that the AKP was backing Al-
Qaeda affiliated groups fighting Kurdish forces in Syria. The Rojava incidence was 
followed by the discourse about the the need for self-rule in Turkey. In addition, there 
were so much stress on “resistance”, “freedom fighters”. The KCK leaders, meanwhile 
were, accusing the AKP of providing aid to Al-Qaeda. For example, “Al-Qaeda’s war is 
Turkey’s war too” wrote Cemil Bayık on January 23, 2014 (Özgür Gündem, 2014). 
They tried to create the sense that the Turkish government was working with Islamist 
groups to weaken the Rojava revolution.  
 
In parallel with the Rojava incident, the PKK increased its threats of violence. “Unless 
the democratic powers do not win the March 30 local elections, this will bring about 
the multiple war. Everybody should be aware of this reality and pave the way for the 
resolution based on democracy if nobody wants this war” said Duran Kalkan in his 
column wirtten on February 2014. He was threatening to start war in Turkey. On the 
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other hand, Öcalan threatened the government that he would end the process if 
there were no upcoming legal reforms (ICG, 2014).  As a result, the parliament 
enacted the MIT law that legally authorized the MIT as a party involved in the peace 
process (Ural 2015). This law legalized MIT’s acts in terms of the peace talks with 
Öcalan and transformed MIT into a completely autonomous agency. At that time, 
Öcalan sent a new letter which was read out to the public in Newruz celebrations just 
to calm the tension and save the process. In the letter, Öcalan said he sought to 
democratization of Turkey, not an independent Kurdistan in Turkish borders. At the 
same time, Cemil Bayık made an explanation on Eurovision TV and said that the PKK 
has its own perspective concerning the AKP and political developments in Turkey. He 
stated the following: 
 
“If they want to kill all Kurds the PKK will escalate the war” (Ural, 2015). As seen, there 
is a clear distinction between Öcalan’s intention to establish peace and the PKK’s 
perception of peace. Within two days after Bayık’s Eurovision speech, the PKK 
published a declaration in which there were statements about the right to self-
determination of Kurds in Turkey and Syria (Akbaba, Daily Sabah, 2014).  
 
As seen, while Öcalan was in a position demanded negotiating in a more legal phase, 
other parties including the HDP and the PKK used more aggressive discourse against 
the government. While governmental officials wanted the PKK to complete the 
withdrawal, in almost every speech of the PKK leaders it is possible to see the theme 
of Rojava, resistance and critical statements concerning the AKP. In this atmosphere, 
where leaders such as Cemil Bayık, Duran Kalkan, Hülya Oran, and Selahattin 
Demirtaş intended to spoil peace process via harsh rhetoric the PKK did continue to 
carry out further attacks. In May, it was discovered that the PKK had kidnapped 
children when parents demanded the PKK to release them. The PKK kidnapped 
students in Lice, Diyarbakır (Al-Monitor, 2014). On the one hand, the YDG-H carried 
out attacks on cities. On the other, the PKK launched several attacks including 
sabotage, assaults on police stations in rural areas, and bombings. For example, in 
September, the YDG-H attacked 23 public schools in four provinces after the call of 
the PKK (DHA, 2014).  
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3.4.2.2. Kobani Incident and Spoiling of Turkey’s Peace Process 
The government enacted the law of “Ending terrorism and achieving social 
integration” that officially established a mechanism to protect those who were 
involved in the peace process. There was new hope to continue negotiations with 
Öcalan to bring peace. However, Syrian Kurdish town Kobani which has a strategic 
importance was attacked by the ISIS in September, 2014. YPG started to fight back in 
cooperation with American forces (Hürriyet, 2014). Kurds in Syria and Turkey began 
to lift their voice to carry attention Kobani and to receive help, because ISIS flag was 
flying over some districts in Kobani. The PKK preferred to use Kobani as a propaganda 
tool, especially by using the discourse of “struggle against the ISIS”. Through 
successful mobilization of the PKK-PYD wing YPG received significant international 
support. The PYD-YPG was provided international military aid as well as political 
support in public. These aids naturally raised the capacity of the PKK and gave a strong 
hand to spoil the process in Turkey. The KNM used Kobani as a way of mobilizing 
Kurds living in Turkey. For example, the HDP-PKK wing threatened the government 
that they would end the process if they did not send help to Kurds in Syrian under the 
ISIS siege. The PKK which had enhanced its military capabilities used ethno-
nationalistic language to convince Kurds that the AKP was backing ISIS. One can see 
so much focus on “AKP’s Jihadist ideology” in the speeches of Cemil Bayık, Duran 
Kalkan, Bese Hozat and Selahattin Demirtaş. They insisted that the peace process in 
Turkey could not be thought of separately from Kobani. The PKK-HDP self confidently 
targeted the AKP with statements like “If one of the members of ISIS becomes a 
parliamentary in the AKP, he will be enthroned by Erdoğan” which Demirtaş said 
publicly in Köln (Özgür Gündem, 2014). During the Kobani siege, Turkey had security 
challenges because of the ongoing war on the Syrian border, so the parliament voted 
to allow Turkish military forces to carry out cross-border operations. This vote drew 
a reaction from the KCK. Pervin Buldan, HDP group deputy chairman also warned the 
government by saying that “if Kobani fell, the process would end” (Hürriyet, 2014). 
Tensions rose especially after important figures in the KNM such as Cemil Bayık and 
Duran Kalkan accused Erdoğan of supporting an ISIS occupation of Kobani occupation 
by the ISIS. Turkey’s inaction in terms of Kobani issue and the PKK-HDP wing’s 
agressive discourse raised ethnic consciousness of Kurds in Turkey therefore, protests 
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against the government disseminated in short time. On October 6, 2014 after 
Demirtaş’s call Kurds who were angry to the government took to the streets. From 
October 6 to October 8 clashes between different groups left about 50 people dead 
and many wounded (Hürriyet, 2014). The HDP and the PKK leaders stated emergency 
call to Kurds to focus on Kobani, but mass protests turned into violent clashes 
between ideologically different groups including Hüda-Par which is religious party 
active in southeast Turkey, Kurdish nationalist groups, Turkish nationalist groups and 
the PKK. After the 6-8 October incident a gunman killed two police officers in Bingöl 
(NTV, 2014). All these events disrupted the resolution process. Öcalan was trying to 
calm masses but the Kobani incident was a turning point in the sense that the Kobani 
events increased the legitimacy of the PKK’s existence in the Middle East and 
delegitimized the AKP Government. As a result, the balance of power between the 
PKK and the AKP changed and put the PKK in a more powerful position.  
 
As mentioned above, 2014 was the year the resolution process was close to 
deteriorate since, domestic and regional developments put the AKP in a weaker 
position than the PKK because PKK-affiliated groups appeared as the main fighter 
against common enemy of the world, ISIS in the Middle East. During this process 
where the balance of power has changed in favor of the PKK, the PKK-HDP leaders 
were provided a great opportunity to victimize themselves in the public eye. The 
Kobani events, especially, proved that the PKK had the capability to influence public 
in a short period of time. They could have stand in a calming position but, they used 
spoiling discourse to convince the masses, as shown in Figure 3.7. below.  
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Figure 3.7. Turkey- PKK conflict; pro-resolution discourse at 365 (75,60 %), and 
spoiling discourse at 1223 (24,40 %) 
 
In Figure 3.7. discourse of spoiling with 75,6 % exceeds pro-resolution discourse 24,3 
%. The PKK leaders and HDP turned to harsh rhetoric focused on “Kurdish resistance”, 
“democratic autonomy”, “AKP-ISIS cooperation”, “the Rojava revolution” “right to 
self-determination” and so on. For example, “Kobani resistance” was used in 16% by 
accusing the government not sending help to civilian people in Kobane. In addition, 
there is a high rates in use of the word “resistance” with 26%. Use of these statements 
naturally undermined mutual confidence. In parallel with the return to harsh rhetoric 
a rise in the use of violent attacks can be seen in Figure 3.8. 
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Figure 3.8. PKK attacks in 2014 (Global terrorism Database) 
 
3.5. Recurrence of Conflict (2015) 
The Kobani incidents were a turning point that undermined trust between the parties 
in the peace process. All parties involved in the peace process saw that regional 
turmoil in the Middle East directly or indirectly fueled ethnic nationalism among 
Kurds. This ethnic nationalism was triggered by KPK-HDP leaders using spoiling 
language that raised hopes for an independent Kurdistan. As a result, Turkey saw a 
return to armed conflict between the military forces and the PKK. 
 
Following the Kobani incidents Cemil Bayık sent a message that would end the 
resolution process by saying the following: 
“Kobani resolution (tezkere)20 launched war against the PKK not ISIS. Turkey ended 
the Solution Process. Turkey ended the peace process. Because Turkey has 
continued to pursue its policies without any changes, we have sent back all our 
fighters that were pulled out of Turkey.” (Ural, 2015). Few days after the speech of 
Cemil Bayık, the PKK carried out three days of  attacks on Dağlıca Police Station using 
rocket-propelled grenades. As a result, Turkish air strikes attacked PKK bases in Zap 
                                                                                                                                                                            
20 Kobani resolution, which authorised the Turkish military to intervene Syria and Iraq, was accepted 
by the Turkish National Assembly on Oct 2, 2014.    
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and Avaşin-Basyan (The Guardian, 2014). For the first time since the peace process 
armed clashes started between the PKK and Turkish military forces.   
 
In this atmosphere where mutual confidence had been derailed, the YDG-H, the 
youth wing of the PKK, continued to attack police forces and run identity checks in 
cities and towns. Davutoğlu explained that the parliament was about to approve 
domestic security bill which had been criticized because of the extraordinary powers 
it gave to police (World Bulletin, 2014). However, he made a speech stating hope and 
intention to continue peace process. He said, “We won’t let terror harm the 
reconciliation process” (Daily Sabah, 2014).  Thus, the approval of the domestic 
security package was delayed so as not to disrupt the peace process. At that time, 
Sabri Ok, exiled PKK-KCK leader, explained that they did not intend to disarm 
(Milliyet, 2014). Following the security package explanation, an aggressive response 
came from the KCK and HDP co-chairs. In his remarks, Demirtaş stated “The package 
is destroying not only the settlement process but all dynamics of social peace. It is 
damaging the peace process and undermining all efforts at peace in society. Based 
on aggressive explanations made by leaders, it can be said that the peace process 
would be very difficult to sustain in 2015.  
 
On the other hand, the MIT-AKP wing and Öcalan were working on a move to make 
peace process sustainable. On January 2015, the government requested Öcalan to 
call for disarmament (Oğur, Türkiye, 2015). Öcalan responded that the government 
must agree on 10-item list road map prepared by Öcalan himself. On February 28, 
2015, Öcalan’s call for disarmament was announced to the media in Dolmabahçe 
Palace with the participation of HDP members, Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın 
Akdoğan, the Minister of Domestic Affairs Efkan Ala, and MIT vice president (Milliyet, 
2015). Öcalan called on the PKK to hold a 12th congress to discuss disarmament in 
return the Turkish government’s acceptance of the 10-item list, including issues on 
the democratic policy, the legal framework of citizenship, the socio-economic phase 
of the resolution process, gender issue, definition of identity and pluralist democracy 
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etc. prepared by himself.21 Dolmabahçe meeting was a document including Öcalan’s 
10 priorities that must be implemented by the Government. In the meeting Yalçın 
Akdoğan also gave positive messages concerning democratization of Turkey. Erdoğan 
made announcement that he denied the so-called Dolmabahçe Agremeent by saying 
“I do not recognize the phrase Dolmabahçe Agreement.” There is a government. So, 
there is a political party with its grassroots [from the PKK]. If there is a step to take 
for the future of our country, this should be made in parliament. There cannot be an 
agreement with a political party that is being supported by a terrorist organization” 
(Hürriyet Daily News, 2015).  
 
Together with the ongoing debates over the Dolmabahçe Agreement, the upcoming 
Parliamentary elections that have a negative influence on the course of peace 
process.  After Demirtaş received 9,75 % of votes in the presidential elections, the 
HDP increased its salience. A pro-Kurdish political party has crossed the threshold for 
the first time in Turkish history. Within the self-confidence due to the rise in votes, 
Demirtaş came up with the harsh slogan “We will not allow you to be president!” in 
his group meeting speech on March 17, 2015 (Hürriyet Daily News, 2015). The success 
of Demirtaş in the presidential elections encouraged increasingly aggressive rhetoric 
against the AKP. For example, Bese Hozat intentionally emphasized on AKP’s loss of 
power in the June 7 selections by stating “Erdoğan and the AKP who lost its majority 
in June 7, did not accept the results.” (Yeni Özgür Politika, 2015). Conciliatory 
messages were replaced by controversial discourse that transformed relations 
between the state and society as well as HDP and AKP. During the pre-election period, 
the HDP abandoned unifying language and used provocative narrative instead 
outlining “AKP’s fascism” “oppressed Kurds” “Roboski massacre” and “Rojava 
revolution.”  Furthermore, the KCK-HDP wing sought to draw more votes in June 7 
elections, so it focused on more polarizing discourse as seen in Figure 3.9. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
21 To read the full text please see http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/ortak-aciklamanin-tam-metni  
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Figure 3.9. Turkey- PKK conflict pro-resolution discourse at 557 (76,80 %), and 
spoiling discourse at 1680 (23,20 %) 
 
Essentially, the HDP and KCK leaders seemed to increase divisive discourse with 76,8 
% of discourse of spoiling. They strongly mentioned genocides in the past, and the 
assimilation and oppression policies of the AKP. For example, among words 
commonly used are “genocide” in 15% and “resistance” in 15%. Moreover, there are 
so much stress on call for autonomy by mentioning “Rojova revolution” and “Kobani 
resistance” words in 9%. They influenced people by blaming the AKP for being 
unwilling to solve the Kurdish issue. The provocative rhetoric adopted by the HDP-
KCK wing was being followed by ongoing attacks by the PKK and YDG-H as well. 
Among these attacks were burning barricades, clash with the security forces, and 
building violence spirals. First, PKK constructed monuments of so-called martyrdoms 
in the cities Ağrı, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Siirt, Şırnak, and Tunceli during the peace 
process. The PKK made ceremonial openings and embedded killed PKK militants over 
there. The PKK meanwhile put up statue of Mahsum Korkmaz who carried out the 
first armed attack of PKK in the entrance of the martyrdom (BBC Türkçe, 2014).  After 
police removed Korkmaz’s statue fighting broke out in many cities. According to Beşir 
Atalay, deputy prime minister, the Korkmaz issue was a provocation to undermine 
peace process (Al-Monitor, 2014). Military vehicles were set on fire and civilians were 
injured in YDG-H attacks following the removal of the statue the Turkish General staff 
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said (Ibid). On April, 2015 PKK attacked soldiers in Ağrı and injured four soldiers (Oğur, 
Türkiye, 2015). After HDP got 13% votes in the parliamentary elections Demirtaş 
stated PKK might lay down arms yet, KCK denied by saying “The will of PKK’s decision 
to end armed struggle belongs to us. Everybody should acknowledge that HDP is not 
the legal party of the PKK. Thus, neither HDP nor Abdullah Öcalan who remains under 
İmralı conditions can make that call to end struggle” in an interview with the Fırat 
News Agency (ANF) newspaper. (Milliyet, 2015).  
 
After the mid-2015 the resolution process evolved into a new phase in which parties 
have returned to a military perspective because of the security alert on the Syrian 
border. KCK was threatening Turkey to react by military means in case Turkish military 
forces launch any attacks on Rojava. On the other hand, “We will never allow the 
establishment of a state in southeast Turkey” said Erdoğan on June 24, 2015 (AA, 
2015). On July 2015, KCK announced it had ended the ceasefire (Hürriyet, 2015). In 
return, KCK announced the starting of people’s revolutionary war. Bese Hozat wrote 
“If our people develop the people’s revolutionary war, the leader Apo will be 
released, and Turkey will attain the real peace and democracy” on his column (Yeni 
Özgür Politika, 2015).  
 
On July 20, 2015, a suicide bombing killed 31 and wounded more than 100 people 
who had met in Suruç, Şanlıurfa to send aid to Syria (BBC Türkçe, 2015). This attack 
was called Suruç massacre and it created a trauma in Turkey because it happened 
during the meeting of young activists to send aid to Kurdish fighters in Kobani. Suruç 
bombing which was one of the bloodiest attacks in Turkey, also the most influential 
incident that contributed to collapse of the peace process which was already in a 
fragile position. Although ISIS claimed responsibility Kurdish politicians and KCK-HDP 
wing blamed AKP as well since they consider AKP as a power behind the ISIS. Duran 
Kalkan’s column under the title of “The AKP massacre under the mask of ISIS” proves 
that the AKP was considered responsible for the Suruç massacre (Yeni Özgür Politika, 
2015). As a result, two police officers, Feyyaz Yumuşak and Okan Acar were murdered 
by the PKK the in their house in retaliation of Suruç bombing (Milliyet, 2015). 
Following the Suruç attack the PKK intensified its violent attacks. As it is shown in 
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Figure 3.10. there was a rapid increase in attacks carried out by the PKK especially in 
the second half of 2015. 
 
 
Figure 3.10. PKK attacks in 2015 (Global Terrorism Database) 
 
Following the escalation of PKK assaults, Erdoğan said, “It is not possible to carry on 
the Solution Process with those, who target our national unity and brotherhood” in 
July, 2015 (Radikal, 2015). In return, Turkish military staff announced Turkish 
airstrikes and launched operations against the PKK in Lice, Diyarbakır, and Hakkari 
(BBC Türkçe, 2015).  
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
 
Today, one of the most significant problems in the world is ethnic conflicts that have 
dramatically dispersed in many parts of the world. This century is dominated by 
asymmetrical conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe, and we face a war in 
which local actors fight each other. All of these protracted conflicts, especially, those 
escalated by an ethnic motivation, leave people with a culture of conflict that is 
difficult to deal with. Although peace is achieved in some cases under the control of 
a third party, a return to conflict is always possible. For example, in the Israel-
Palestine case, there were several peace agreements to which the conflicting parties 
agreed but still the conflict continues. In South Sudan, after a ceasefire in 2013, the 
opposition group backed by the ex-president Riek Machar continued to fight against 
South Sudan army (Şarkul Avsat, 2018). Ethnic tension is still alive in the South Sudan. 
Needless to say, Syria houses a catastrophic civil war despite the peace talks held in 
Geneva yet, which have all failed. As in these cases, the PKK’s ethnic separatist 
violence and Turkey’s counterterrorism struggle is an example of a protracted 
conflict. Furthermore, there was a very hopeful peace initiative between the years 
2013 and 2015 but it ended. The question is what brings peace talks to an end? Why 
do actors involved in a peace process return to conflict? On this point, my basic 
argument rests on the spoiler theory (Stedman, 1997). I argue that peace processes 
end simply because of the actors’ spoiling behavior. There can be inside spoilers who 
involved in a peace process but never committed to peace settlements (Stedman, 
1997). It is not possible to reach a settled peace in the presence of actors called as 
spoilers since they disrupt the process through violent and non-violent means. If 
there are no custodians who are capable of dealing with these actors, spoilers will 
take advantage of this situation to achieve their goals. As a result, when they succeed 
peace processes come to the end. 
 
Drawing upon the Turkish case, this thesis offered an explanation with three 
objectives: First is to present how spoiling behavior of the PKK had an impact on the 
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collapse of peace process in Turkey. Second is to show why and under what 
conditions they decide to spoil peace. Last is to see if the Spoiler Theory can be 
applied to Turkish case. Based on these objectives, I argue that, the peace process to 
end the Turkey- PKK conflict was destroyed as the PKK, broke the ceasefire. The ruling 
elites including the Turkish National Intelligence Agency (MIT) and governmental 
officials (JDP) initiated peace talks at the end of 2012. These talks became public in 
December, 2012 after Erdoğan announced that the MIT officials had held a meeting 
with Öcalan in order to draw a roadmap for negotiations. After the process was 
announced by Erdoğan on television in December, 2012, a wisemen committee was 
founded to explain the process to the public and gain public support. In addition to 
governmental contacts, members of the BDP such as Pervin Buldan, Sırrı Süreyya 
Önder, and Altan Tan were allowed to visit Öcalan. In one meeting the committee 
created a roadmap including the withdrawal of the PKK militants from Turkey, 
performing democratic reforms, and integration of PKK militants into society (Köse, 
2017). However, this positive atmosphere ended soon.  
 
Even though the PKK declared ceasefire in 2013, it returned to violence in 2015. The 
peace process in Turkey failed because The PKK acted as an inside spoiler in Turkish 
peace process. It was one of the parties to peace talks but cheated. At that point, I 
argue that, domestic and regional context Turkey faced at the times negatively 
influenced the process in a way that provided the PKK had a great opportunity to turn 
into a regional power who intended to war for regional autonomy. Within the context 
of domestic issues, the turning points were the presidential elections, Gezi Park 
protests and December 17 accusations against the JDP, which fueled the PKK’s 
spoiling activities. Second, regional turmoil caused by the Syrian war encouraged the 
PKK to disregard the requirements for the negotiation. In the case of Turkey, this 
thesis basically argues that the PKK acted as a spoiler even if there was a compromise 
between the PKK’s imprisoned leader Öcalan and the Government to end conflict. 
While the PKK was a party to the peace talks it turned the spoiler. As a spoiler the 
PKK succeed to break the process especially as balance of power changed in favor of 
the PKK as a result of domestic and regional developments. 
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This thesis focused on spoiler theory since it fills the gap in the peace studies 
literature by offering an actor-based explanation. Even though the parties involved 
in the peace process designed the best plan for settling peace, when one of the 
parties think the plan is not to their interests, it is ready to spoil this plan (Stedman, 
1997). There are convincing studies which mentioned importance of demobilization 
and long-term peace-building efforts. Stedman, says that the threat of spoilers must 
be overcome if peace talks are to be successful (Stedman, 1997). He coins the terms 
inside spoiler, and total spoiler whose spoiling behaviors reduced during the peace 
talks. They seemed willing to sit in negotiation table and do their best for making 
peace. However, they keep military capabilities alive though. They can expand targets 
in accordance with their cost-benefit calculations. When they decide peace is not for 
benefit to them they can resume violence. Their willingness to peace is only tactical 
and for taking an upper hand in their fights (ibid). If there is no custodians, which can 
be a third part or parties to peace talks, to carry out strategies to manage spoiler 
problem, spoilers succeed to break peace process. Based on Spoiler theory, while 
Stedman argues the importance of spoiler management through several strategies, I 
also put regards on the importance of the context. In Turkish case, the peace process 
failed because the PKK as a spoiler succeed to violate peace process not only because 
of the absence of custodians, the PKK also took the advantage of domestic and 
regional context.  
 
I used content analysis to test my argument with regard to how the peace process in 
Turkey ended. I carried out content analysis of the statements of important figures 
in the PKK including Cemil Bayık, Duran Kalkan (Selahattin Erdem), Hülya Oran (Bese 
Hozat)and Selahattin Demirtaş, the head of the HDP. I chose these names because 
they are the representatives and decision-makers of the PKK. I focus on the 
newspapers Özgür Gündem and Yeni Özgür Politika publishing in Turkish. I use the 
code spoiling if statements of the PKK and HDP leaders uses the words such as 
resistance, people’s revolutionary war and so on as an act of spoiling the 
normalization process caused by peace talks to spread the idea that nothing has 
changed. I use the code of pro-resolution process if leaders contribute to resolution 
process by mentioning negotiation, peace and so on. In the content analysis, I 
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searched for the frequency of the words below during the resolution process in 
Turkey in order to offer an explanation on how the PKK violated the peace process: 
 
Spoiling Discourse 
 Resistance (Direniş/Serhildan) 
 People’s Revolutionary War (Devrimci Halk Savaşı) 
 Kobane Resistance (Kobane Direnişi) 
 Rojava Revolution (Rojava Devrimi) 
 Demobilization (Tasfiye) 
 Assimilation (Asimilasyon) 
 Genocide (Katliam/Soykırım) 
 Fascist mentality (Faşist zihniyet) 
 ISIS alliance (IŞİD müttefiki) 
 
Pro-Resolution Process 
 Negotiation (Müzakere) 
 Peace (Barış) 
 Withdrawal (Çekilme) 
 Solution (Çözüm) 
 Optimism (İyimserlik) 
 Democratization (Demokratikleşme) 
 New beginning (Yeni Başlangıç) 
 Newroz 
 Political struggle (Siyasi Mücadele) 
 
I viewed the columns written by the Kurdish leaders I mentioned above, and made a 
frequency analysis and latent analysis in order to guarantee reliability. I formed an 
original dataset including about 300 columns, interviews, and public meeting 
statements. I show the results in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1. Frequency and percentage table according to content analysis dataset 
 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Spoiling 118 64.84 622 48.94 1223 77.02 1680 75.11 
Pro-
resolution 
64 35.16 649 51.06 365 22.98 557 24.89 
TOTAL  182 100 1271 100 1588 100 2237 100 
 
My primary objective was to show how the discourse of PKK representatives was 
generally anti-resolutionary even in the time when parties continued dialogue. In 
addition, I want to show how the PKK escalated tension via spoiling discourse in 
specific times that gave advantage to the PKK. Intention to pursue peace never 
became high, and finally turned to a cost-benefit calculation. They followed their 
primary goal of establishing autonomy. The results are consistent with what I argued 
in the thesis. First, throughout the peace talks between conflicting parties any 
administrative figures in the PKK used aggressive discourse except for during the first 
half of 2013. Second, there are specific periods when they increased tension with 
their statements in parallel with armed attacks. These periods coincided with events 
such as the presidential elections and Kobani events known as 6-8 October events in 
Turkey in terms of domestic issues, and de facto declaration of autonomy of Rojova 
in Northeastern Syria in terms of the regional dynamics. Finally, frequency analysis 
reveals that the leaders of the PKK particularly used words such as “Resistance” 
“Kobane Resistance” “Rojova Revolution” “Genocide”  “Fascist JDP” and “ISIS 
alliance” in their statements to influence public opinion especially in those specific 
periods.  
 
The year 2012 was a year of harsh conflicts. The political upheaval of the Rojova 
canton was an important step toward the declaration of regional autonomy (Hürriyet, 
2014). Aggressive language was at a peak between the parties because the PKK 
escalated its attacks as a result of its “hit and stay” strategy (Bahar,2013). Armed 
assaults left many dead and injured. There was no sign of dialogue between the 
parties. Spoiling discourse is rather more than pro-resolution discourse in the year 
2012. While leaders of the PKK used spoiling language by 64.5%, they used pro-
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resolution discourse only by 35.5%. There was so much attention to Roboski event 
and that kept people’s feeling of resentment alive because they considered the 
government responsible. After a while people learned that the government was in 
contact with Öcalan to find a solution to the conflict. Turkey was embracing a new 
process of dialogue that would bring about de-escalation in the first part of 2013. 
Following bilateral meetings the parties turned gentle towards one another as seen 
in Öcalan’s statements in the Newroz letter sent to be read out in public: “We have 
come to a point today where guns shall be silenced, and thoughts and ideas shall 
speak” (NYT, 2013).  
 
I would expect to see they reduce the tension completely because the Kurdish polity 
and the PKK wing seemed willing to reach a peace agreement. However, the results 
showed that they continued to address maximalist demands such as establishing an 
autonomous Kurdish region as well as formation of Kurdish unification in “Kurdistan” 
area which lies on borders of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. Indeed, Leaders in Kandil 
made mostly pro-resolution explanations during the first half of 2013. Spoiling 
discourse at 48.94% was less than pro-resolution expressions at 51.06%. However, I 
also saw remarks about “Rojova Revolution”, and “resistance” since Kurdish 
unification and regional autonomy in Turkish-Syrian border was a hot topic at the 
time. 
 
The results show that on the one hand, the word “solution” was used at 22%, while 
“Rojova revolution” was also mentioned 20%. The word “resistance” was mentioned 
as well, at 15%. Naturally, it is not possible to see an obvious intention to reach a 
peace agreement since it can be concluded that they never left maximalist demands 
that would hurt trust-building among parties. The question is when exactly those 
words were stated. Especially, after August 2013, anti-resolution discourse was high 
again. They moved away from dialogue at that point, the PKK was renovating its 
power by generating a city-based militant group called YDG-H. Murat Karayılan, the 
head of the KCK was replaced by Cemil Bayık in July 2013, who is known as hardline 
and Bese Hozat in the KCK Congress. Following the reshuffle within the PKK, Cemil 
Bayık warned the government to take measures before he ordered a to stop to the 
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withdrawal. On the second anniversary of “the Rojava Revolution”, which is the 
capture of Afrin, Ayn-el Arab (Kobane) and Derik by People’s Protection Units (YPG) 
in Syria, aggressive discourse began to replace pro-resolution language. There were 
so much attention to people’s revolutionary war in order to calls for mass street 
protests against the “oppressor state”.  
 
Despite positive developments, including legal regulations in favor of multi-ethnic 
education and trial, 2014 turned into a year that brought the process to a deadlock. 
In terms of the domestic context, the Gezi Park protests and December 17 operations 
had a traumatic impact on Turkish politics. The credibility of the governing party was 
questioned by the public. In addition, in January 2014 Rojava canton, which consists 
of Afrin, Jazira, and Euphrates regions, declared de facto autonomy. These all 
provided an upper hand to the PKK. At that time, anti-resolution discourse at 75.60% 
dominated 2014. In doing content analysis, my primary aim was to show that 2014 
was an important turning point. There were so many domestic and regional 
developments that encouraged the PKK not to keep its promises, including its 
promise withdrawal from Turkey. Naturally, that resulted in an end to the process of 
negotiation.  
 
The results of the content analysis supported my argument that claims the PKK kept 
using stealth methods in the peace process. Among those methods were increasing 
military capabilities and infiltrating cities, using aggressive and accusatory rhetoric 
against the government, and not pulling militants from Turkey. The PKK did succeed 
in stalling peace for two reasons. First, there was no authority to carry coercion 
strategies to manage spoilers. Second, the context increased the PKK’s capabilities to 
act as a spoiler. The results pursued this argument since the frequency of the words 
coded as spoiling, increased at particular times such as pre-election times, Rojava 
conflict, and 6-8 October Kobane events. First, after the Rojava incidence, it is 
possible to see anger against the JDP. Top leaders of the PKK put the JDP on the same 
level as the ISIS as seen in the statement “Al-Qaeda’s war is Turkey’s war too” of 
Cemil Bayık (Özgür Gündem, 2014). Another peak in harsh rhetoric appeared during 
the electoral period in both the local and the presidential elections held in 2014. In 
 
81 
parallel with the Rojava incident, and especially before the elections, the PKK 
increased its threats of violence. “Unless democratic powers win the March 30 local 
elections, this will bring about the multi-front war.” (Yeni Özgür Politika, 2014), said 
Duran Kalkan in his column. Graphics taken from the Global Terrorism Database show 
that most of the armed attacks committed by the PKK occurred before the 
presidential elections of 2014. On the other hand, contrary to my expectations, we 
see low level of attacks before the local elections.  
 
Last but not least, the Kobani conflict against ISIS in northern Syria was another issue 
that turned to a propaganda instrument for the PKK. Spoiling discourse was high in 
September as a result of Kobani events but still, less than it was in months before the 
elections. On the other hand, October 6-8, 2014 protests that broke after Demirtaş’s 
call of people to the streets left about 50 people dead and many wounded (Hürriyet, 
2014). Following the Kobani incidents Cemil Bayık sent a message that would end the 
resolution process: “Turkey ended the Solution Process. Turkey ended the peace 
process. Because Turkey has continued to pursue its policies without any changes, 
we have sent back all our fighters that were pulled out of Turkey” (Ural, 2015). A 
few days after the speech of Cemil Bayık, the PKK carried out three days of attacks on 
the Dağlıca Police Station using rocket-propelled grenades (The Guardian, 2014).  At 
that time, among columns written by top figures in the PKK, “Kobani resistance” 
became apparent at 16% in addition to “resistance” at 26%. Taking all of these into 
account, the PKK seized the opportunities by using discourse that harmed the process 
in addition to continuing violent attacks.  
 
In 2015, spoiling discourse became dominant at 76.80% whereas pro-resolution 
discourse fell to 23.20%. While YDG-H backed by the PKK got the power in some 
provinces, the government nevertheless remained in contact with Öcalan in order to 
calm down the tension. However, YDG-H was running identity checks and fighting 
with the police officials while PM Davutoğlu made a speech saying “We won’t let 
terror harm the reconciliation process” (Daily Sabah, 2014).  When the parliamentary 
elections were held on June 7, 2015, the picture became more complicated because 
the parties cast accusations against each other. Demirtaş’s statement “We will not 
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allow you to be president” gained popularity, and influenced negatively the 
atmosphere between the government and HDP in the process of dialogue. As seen, 
the picture did not change in 2015 because the aggressive rhetoric used during the 
Kobani events continued to influence the peace atmosphere in negative respects.  
 
Most of the attacks launched by the PKK in the first part of 2015 occurred between 
February and May during the electoral period. Simply put, the time of spoiling codes 
overlap with this specific periods. In July 2015, the KCK announced it had ended the 
ceasefire (Hürriyet, 2015). In return, the KCK announced the start of a people’s 
revolutionary war. Bese Hozat wrote “If our people develop the people’s 
revolutionary war, the leader Apo will be released, and Turkey will attain the real 
peace and democracy” in her column (Yeni Özgür Politika, 2015). As in other years, 
the representatives of the PKK claimed that JDP was the ally of ISIS in 2015 as well. 
They call JDP as a “thief” in most of their statements as so accusing JDP of ignoring 
democracy in Turkey. Furthermore, after HDP increased votes on June 7, they put 
more pressure on JDP that was seen as a looser. For example, Bese Hozat said “JDP 
who lost power must recognize the results of the elections” (Özgür Gündem, 2015). 
Lastly, murder of two police officers in retaliation for the Suruç attacks ended the 
process since the PKK broke the ceasefire several times. The PKK resumed fierce 
attacks in the second part of 2015. It was clear that they accused the JDP of the Suruç 
bombing by claiming ISIS was encouraged by the JDP. When we look at the words 
most frequently mentioned, my results support this idea, since “genocide” is used 
most frequently at 15%.  
 
As seen in the process itself and in the content analysis results, it can be said that the 
results that I have obtained through manifest and latent content analysis support the 
argument that the there was a spoiler in the Turkish case that seemed willing to 
commit peace tactically but never fulfilled the requirements. This spoiler agency 
appeared amongst the top figures in the PKK that controlled the armed wing. They 
spoiled the Turkish peace process in two ways.  
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First, they did not keep their promise to withdraw and they never gave up their 
ambitions of establishing an autonomous region on Turkish-Syrian border. For this 
reason, they used spoiling discourse in their statements. Their use of the term 
“Rojava revolution”, and their call for “resistance” in almost every column and public 
meeting supports this argument. Second, they continued to carry out violent attacks 
during the process. They created YDG-H while the government was holding 
democratization package including new reforms with regards to minority right in 
Turkey. Besides, they never stopped using threats of violence even when their leader 
Öcalan wanted them to disarm and provide a suitable ground for negotiations. They 
could easily act as a spoiler in Turkey’s peace process simply because they found a 
great chance of being an important actor as the regional context evolved. The context 
helped them to increase their capabilities and gave them opportunities to act as a 
free rider. The PKK benefited from the power vacuum in Syria and from domestic 
issues that brought political instability to Turkey. The times when they used harsh 
rhetoric mostly coincided with important events that put them in a stronger position 
against the government. Since there was no independent third party to manage the 
process via strategies of punishing the spoilers the process soon came to an end 
(Stedman, 1997). This is why, this study reveals that the presence of a third party in 
peace processes ensures that spoilers know they will be punished in case they return 
to conflict. In the Turkish case, it is important to know for the future research, an 
outside party might have prevented the PKK from behaving like a spoiler. The thing 
is to understand what kind of spoilers we have and act accordingly. At that point, the 
PKK-HDP wing can be called as greedy spoiler. Greedy can be since increase in the 
spoiling discourse coincided with the particular times of events that influenced the 
decisions of the top figure in the PKK to continue war or not. They were convinced to 
declare ceasefire but they failed to carry out. A custodian party might have 
interpreted the motivations of the parties to spoil peace and take action to encourage 
them to work in favor of peace. As in Stedman’s way of spoiler management, 
custodians might have carried strategies such as inducement, socialization or 
coercion (Stedman, 1997).  
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In arguing the Turkish case from the perspective of Spoiler Theory, this thesis has 
several limitations. First, it is limited in the sense of language. Since I cannot speak 
Kurdish, I could not analyze texts written in Kurdish. I have only a limited capacity to 
evaluate information provided by both parties. I had access to Turkish and English 
resources only. In order to deal with this limitation, this thesis focused on a 
representative sample of texts written by prominent PKK and HDP leaders in Turkish 
language. Second, it would have allowed me to make more contributions to peace 
literature to compare the Turkish case to other cases that experienced a peace 
process. In addition, looking at the discourse of the government as well in content 
analysis would allow me to provide a comprehensive perspective in the thesis. Third, 
the failure of the 2012-2015 peace process in Turkey is a new issue that has not been 
studied before. The newness of the case makes it difficult to access relevant 
information.  
 
On the other hand, the Turkish case is one of the most important cases since Turkey 
has been home to 40 years of protracted conflict based on ethnic issues. After a long 
time, Turkey attempted to bring peace home. Turkey lies in very chaotic region in 
which a large number of state and non-state actors are active. Therefore, it is 
important to study such a complicated region with reference to a theory that focuses 
on actors’ perceptions. Thus, finding a way to solve these kinds of conflicts would 
offer an important model for peacemakers. 
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APPENDIX 
CODEBOOK 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITION VALUES 
Full name Names of the 
representatives 
and leaders of the 
PKK, KCK and HDP. 
 
1) Cemil Bayık is one of the 
founders of the PKK. He 
was the head of armed 
wing of the PKK (HPG), 
thenbecame the co-
president of the KCK with 
Hülya Oran in July 2013. 
2) Duran Kalkan (Selahattin 
Erdem) is one of the 
founders of the PKK and in 
executive committee of the 
PKK.  
3) Hülya Oran (Bese Hozat) is 
the co-president of the KCK 
4) Selahattin Demirtaş is the 
co-chairman of the HDP 
(2014-2018).  
 
Date The date when the 
speech/text is 
delivered in the 
original source. 
Specific dates from November 5, 
2012 to December 12, 2015. 
Type The way in which 
the top leaders 
share their ideas in 
public during the 
peace process. 
1) Interview is the meeting 
where the top figures are 
asked about the course of 
the process and agenda. 
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2) Public speech is the 
instances when leaders of 
political parties make their 
speechs to the public (e.g., 
electoral rally speech).  
3) Group meeting speech 
consists of speechs 
delivered in political party 
group meeting in the 
Assembly. 
4) Column is text written for a 
newspaper written by the 
top leaders themselves.  
5) News is the daily news that 
contain the speeches of the 
leaders. 
6) TV Program is interviews in 
which the speaker is asked 
questions by journalists on 
TV. 
7) Panel is seminars in which 
Selahattin Demirtaş 
participate as a speaker. 
Latent Latent includes the 
general meaning 
and underlying 
message of the 
texts with regard 
to whether texts 
give pro-
1) Green colored texts means 
that the text gives positive 
messages via pro-
resolutionary statements by 
referring to dialogue, 
intention to withdrawal of 
armed forces from Turkey 
and reconciliation. The text 
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resolutionary or 
spoiling messages.  
 
in the box gives the main 
idea of the message. 
2) Yellow and red colored texts 
mean that the text gives 
negative messages with 
spoiling statements including 
threats of using violence, 
provocative statements 
against the JDP, etc. 
 
Source Media organs that 
belong to the PKK. 
Top leaders of the 
PKK use these 
newspapers to 
share their ideas 
and give messages 
to the public.  
 
Özgür Gündem and Yeni Özgür 
Politika. 
URL Links of the texts 
used in content 
analysis. 
 
http://www.ozgur-gundem.com/ 
http://www.yeniozgurpolitika.org/  
Date accessed The date when the 
source is accessed. 
Specific dates 
Set of manifest 
analysis variables 
(i.e., Diren-, 
Serhildan, Halk 
Savaşı, Kobane 
Direnişi, Rojava 
The frequency of 
the variable used in 
the text. Words are 
classified in two 
categories 
including words 
Numeric: 0 to 49 
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Devrimi, Tasfiye, 
Asimilasyon, 
Katliam/Soykırım, 
Faşist zihniyet, IŞİD 
müttefiki, Müzakere, 
Barış, Çekilme, 
Çözüm, İyimserlik, 
Demokratikleşme, 
Yeni Başlangıç, 
Nevruz, Siyasi 
Mücadele.) 
 
coded as pro-
resolutionary 
(green colored) and 
the words coded as 
spoiling (red and 
yellow colored). 
These are the key 
words selected 
since the main 
figures leading the 
PKK and HDP 
repeated those 
words so much 
when they want to 
give signals to 
public and the 
other side.  
 
 
 
Words as sign of pro-resolutionary statements are: 
 Negotiation (Müzakere): Intention at reaching an agreement 
 Peace (Barış): End of violence. 
 Withdrawal (Çekilme): Pullout of the PKK militants from Turkey.  
 Solution (Çözüm): Resolution of the Kurdish issue. 
 Optimism (İyimserlik): Confidence about the dialogue with the JDP. 
 Democratization (Demokratikleşme): Taking action for making progress in 
human rights. 
 New beginning (Yeni Başlangıç): End of violence and finding solutions to the 
Kurdish issue. 
 Newroz (Nevruz): A special day celebrated by Kurds and Turks.  
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 Political struggle (Siyasi Mücadele): Replacement of armed struggle by 
political struggle for human rights. 
 
Words as sign of spoiling statements are: 
 Resistance (Direniş): Call to oppose against “invasions” of the Turkish 
government 
 Serhildan: Kurdish upprisings against Turkey 
 People’s Revolutionary war (Halk Savaşı): Alternative to negotiations in order 
to reach main objective of independent Kurdistan. 
 Kobane Resistance (Kobane Direnişi): Call for resistance against the invasion 
of Kobane region in Syria. 
 Rojava Revolution (Rojava Devrimi): Establishment of an autonomous canton 
Rojova in Syria. 
 Demobilization (Tasfiye): The claim that the JDP adopts a demobilization 
policy towards Kurds.  
 Assimilation (Asimilasyon): The claim of state policy towards Kurds living in 
Turkey. 
 Genocide (Katliam/Soykırım): The claim that the JDP supports all attacks 
against Kurds.   
 Fascist mentality (Faşist zihniyet): Mentality behind Turkish state in policies 
towards Kurds. 
 ISIS alliance (IŞİD müttefiki): The claim that the JDP backs ISIS.  
 
